Bejma, Vicki J.

English

HELIN Digital Commons

1999 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Remedies

DOCS@RWU

Roger Williams University Law ReviewVolume 5 | Issue 2 Article 26Spring 20001999 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases:RemediesVicki J. BejmaRoger Williams University School of LawFollow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LRThis Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion inRoger Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.Recommended CitationBejma, Vicki J. (2000) "1999 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Remedies," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 5: Iss. 2,Article 26.Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol5/iss2/26SURVEY SECTIONRemedies. DePasquale v. Venus Pizza, 727 A.2d 683 (R.I. 1999).Under section 3-14-10(e) of the Rhode Island General Laws, anonreckless defendant may seek contribution from a reckless de-fendant where the two defendants act as joint tortfeasors in pro-ducing a single injury. A single injury is produced where onetortfeasor recklessly serves alcohol to an intoxicated person, and anonreckless driver strikes that person with an automobile. In ad-dition, a joint tortfeasor does not extinguish his right to contribu-tion by entering into a settlement agreement releasing alldefendants.FACTS AND TRAVELIn DePasquale v. Venus Pizza,' the decedent, Joseph Marti-nelli (Martinelli), died as a result of being struck by Carmino C.DePasquale's (DePasquale) automobile while walking down Route3 in Coventry, Rhode Island.2 Prior to the accident, Martinellispent about four hours drinking twelve sixteen-ounce beers at arestaurant owned and operated by Venus Pizza (Venus).3 Accord-ing to a witness statement, the decedent was seen staggering onthe road just prior to the accident. 4 Minutes later, DePasqualestruck Martinelli with his car. 5 According to DePasquale's writtenstatement, Martinelli walked out in front of DePasquale's vehicle,and DePasquale could not avoid hitting him. 6 No evidence existsin the record of negligence on the part of DePasquale. 7Martinelli's daughter brought a wrongful death claim againstDePasquale.8 DePasquale and Martinelli's daughter entered intoa settlement agreement which released DePasquale, Venus, andDePasquale's insurer from all claims.9 The agreement made nomention as to whether DePasquale would seek indemnification orcontribution from Venus. 101. 727 A.2d 683 (R.I. 1999).2. See id. at 684.3. See id.4. See id.5. See id.6. See id.7. See id.8. See id.9. See id. at 684-85.10. See id. at 685.20001798 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:601After entering into this settlement, DePasquale brought an ac-tion against Venus seeking contribution and/or indemnificationfrom Venus." DePasquale's complaint alleged that Venus had vio-lated Rhode Island's Liquor Liability Act,12 in that "their agents orservants recklessly served alcoholic beverages to [decedent] whowas a visibly intoxicated individual or intentionally served said[decedent] knowing him to be visibly intoxicated and consciouslydisregarding the obvious and substantial risk that the serving ofalcoholic beverages to said [decedent] would cause physicalharm."'13Venus moved for dismissal of the case or, in the alternative,for summary judgment.14 The trial court granted Venus' motionfor summary judgment,15 finding that Venus' violation of the Li-quor Liability Act was a separate injury from DePasquale's strik-ing Martinelli with his car.' 6 The trial court also found thatDePasquale waived his claim for indemnification or contributionagainst Venus by entering into a settlement agreement with Mar-tinelli's estate. 17 DePasquale appealed.' 8ANALYSIS AND HOLDING]Joint TortfeasorsThe trial court concluded that DePasquale and Venus were notjoint tortfeasors by relying on Wilson v. Krasnoff.19 In Wilson, theRhode Island Supreme Court held that a tortfeasor who inflictedan injury on the plaintiff and the physicians that negligentlytreated the plaintiffs injury were not joint tortfeasors. 20 The trialjustice in the instant case concluded that "there might have beentwo injuries. One, [the decedent] might have [had] too much11. See id.12. R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-14-4 (1956) (1998 Reenactment).13. DePasquale, 727 A.2d at 686.14. See id. at 685.15. See id. The court notes that the record is unclear as to which motion wasactually granted. See id. at 685 n.1. Since the trial justice considered mattersoutside the pleadings however, the court treats the dismissal as the granting of amotion for summary judgment. See id. (citing Ewing v. Frank, 234 A.2d 840, 841(1967)).16. See id. at 686.17. See id. at 685.18. See id. at 684.19. 560 A.2d 335 (R.I. 1989).20. See id. at 341.SURVEY SECTIONcerveza, and the second, that he found himself-a bumper beingtoo close to his body ... And the latter was the cause of death."21The Rhode Island Supreme Court distinguished Wilson fromthe instant case, stating that the injuries in Wilson did not involvethe same injury, but rather a series of injuries occurring over ayear on several distinct occasions. 22 The court noted that Law-rence v. Pokara,23 which held that a driver and a pub that servedalcohol to that driver were joint tortfeasors with respect to a per-son injured by that driver, was the controlling case. 24The court then analyzed the statutes supporting DePasquale'sclaim against Venus. Under Rhode Island's Liquor Liability Act,25there is a right to recovery for a decedent's estate where a defend-ant recklessly served alcohol to that decedent.26 Furthermore,Rhode Island General Laws section 3-14-10(e) provides that "[incases of reckless conduct, nonreckless defendants have a right ofeither indemnification or contribution from any recklessdefendants."27DePasquale alleged in his complaint that Venus recklessly orintentionally served Martinelli, who was visibly intoxicated. 28 Thesupreme court agreed with DePasquale's assertion that there wasno evidence that he himself was reckless in causing the accident,and that a material issue of fact existed with respect to whetherVenus recklessly served Martinelli.29 Therefore, the court con-cluded that the trial court should not have granted summary judg-ment.30 If DePasquale could establish Venus recklessly servedMartinelli, his own non-recklessness in hitting Martinelli, and thatMartinelli's consumption of alcohol was the proximate cause of theaccident, then a jury could conclude that Venus was a jointtortfeasor and that DePasquale was entitled to contribution fromVenus. 3121. DePasquale, 727 A.2d at 686.22. See id. at 685-86.23. 606 A.2d 987 (R.I. 1992).24. See id. at 988.25. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-14-4 (1956) (1998 Reenactment).26. See DePasquale, 727 A.2d at 686.27. R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-14-10(e) (1956) (1998 Reenactment).28. See DePasquale, 727 A.2d at 686.29. See id.30. See id.31. See id.20001800 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:601Waiver of Right to ContributionThe supreme court also held that the trial court erred whenfinding "as a matter of law that the execution of the release evi-dences the intent of the DePasquales not to seek any contributionfrom the defendant."32 Subsequent to the ruling of the trial jus-tice, the Rhode Island Supreme Court decided the case of Hawkinsv. Gadoury.33 In Hawkins, the plaintiff sought contribution fromthe defendant after settling a claim arising from an automobile ac-cident brought by an injured third party.34 The settlement re-leased both Hawkins and Gadoury, although no claim was broughtagainst Gadoury.35The Hawkins court held that under Rhode Island GeneralLaws section 10-6-5, the plaintiff did not waive the right to contri-bution by entering into the settlement agreement.36 Under thestatute, "[a] joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with theinjured person is not entitled to recover contribution from anotherjoint tortfeasor whose liability to the injured person is not extin-guished by the settlement."37 The court held that the legislaturewould not have included the language pertaining to tortfeasorswhose liability was not extinguished by settlement had it intendedthat only tortfeasors whose liability had been finally adjudicatedafter a trial were entitled to contribution. 38 Furthermore, a con-trary reading of the statute would decrease the incentive to enterinto settlement agreements.3 9Therefore, based on its prior ruling in Hawkins, the Rhode Is-land Supreme Court overturned the trial justice's ruling thatDePasquale waived his right to contribution from Venus by enter-ing the settlement agreement with Martinelli's estate.32. Id.33. 713 A.2d 799 (R.I. 1998). Although the supreme court held the trial jus-tice's ruling was in error, it noted that the trial justice "did not have the benefit ofour recent opinion in Hawkins." DePasquale, 727 A.2d at 686.34. See Hawkins, 713 A.2d at 801.35. See id.36. See id. at 806.37. DePasquale, 727 A.2d at 686-87 (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-6-5 (1956)(1997 Reenactment)).38. See Hawkins, 713 A.2d at 806.39. See id.20001 SURVEY SECTION 801CONCLUSIONThe Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that anonreckless defendant may seek contribution and/or indemnifica-tion from a reckless defendant where the two defendants are jointtortfeasors producing a single injury. Where a nonreckless defend-ant claims that another defendant acted recklessly, there is a fac-tual dispute over whether the two defendants are joint tortfeasors,and summary judgment is improper. In addition, a joint tortfeasordoes not waive his right to contribution by entering a settlementagreement releasing all defendants.Vicki J. Bejma

https://docs.rwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1157&amp;context=rwu_LR

1999 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Remedies

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

HELIN Digital Commons

HELIN Digital Commons

DOCS@RWU