Lordan, Christopher H.

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1998 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Statute of Limitations

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Roger Williams University Law ReviewVolume 4 | Issue 2 Article 19Spring 19991998 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Statuteof LimitationsChristopher H. LordanRoger Williams University School of LawFollow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LRThis Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion inRoger Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.Recommended CitationLordan, Christopher H. (1999) "1998 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Statute of Limitations," Roger Williams University LawReview: Vol. 4: Iss. 2, Article 19.Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol4/iss2/19800 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:605Statutes of Limitations. Smith v. O'Connell, 997 F. Supp. 226(D.R.I. 1998). The statute of limitations tolling provision for "un-sound mind" under Rhode Island law refers to a mental conditionthat renders a person incapable of managing his or her daily af-fairs, and does not encompass more limited disabilities such as aselective inability to recall particular facts or reluctance to seeklegal redress based on those facts.FACTS AND TRAVELThe plaintiffs allege that, as minors, they were victims of sex-ual abuse by various Roman Catholic priests in Providence, RhodeIsland.' Suit was brought against the individual priests, thechurches in which each served, and other officials of the RomanCatholic Diocese (defendants).2Brothers Stephen and Michael Kelly made allegations of abuseagainst Fr. Robert Marcantonio. Stephen claimed that the abuseoccurred throughout his high school years, while Michael allegedabuse during his high school years continuing into college.3 Ken-neth Smith alleged abuse by Fr. William O'Connell which allegedlytranspired while the plaintiff attended high school.4After he was abused, Kenneth Smith went on to attend college,served in the National Guard, was married and held numerous po-sitions of employment. 5 In the years prior to the commencement ofthe action, Smith's troubled life included psychiatric counseling, aswell as substance abuse and treatment programs. Smith had norecollection of the alleged abuses until sometime during 1991 or1992.6Michael Kelly, however, was fully conscious of the assaultsever since their occurrences. 7 He lived a stable life despite a drink-ing problem, and claimed that it was not until 1991 that he real-ized the improper nature of Fr. Marcantonio's actions.8 Until thattime, Kelley had the mistaken belief, at Fr. Marcantonio's direc-1. See Smith v. O'Connell, 997 F. Supp 226, 230 (D.R.I. 1998).2. See id.3. See id.4. See id.5. See id. at 231.6. See id.7. See id.8. See id.SURVEY SECTIONtion, that the actions were part of his religious training regardingsexuality. 9Following the assaults, Stephen Kelly suffered turmoil in hispersonal life. While still in college, he turned to drug use andeventually withdrew from classes. 10 Subsequently, he was unableto maintain steady employment and lived off welfare benefits".He eventually entered counseling to manage his depression andsubstance abuse.12 It was during these counseling sessions whenhe revealed the assaults by Fr. Marcantonio. Like his brother, Ste-phen had always been aware of what had happened, but failed torecognized any wrongful conduct because he too was told that suchactivity was merely part of his religious training. 13All three plaintiffs filed suit in 1993, long after each had at-tained the age of majority.14 At the time of the alleged abuses,twenty-one was the age of majority in Rhode Island for statute oflimitations tolling purposes. 15BACKGROUNDStatute of LimitationsPrior to 1992, the Rhode Island law pertaining to claims ofchildhood sexual abuse required that suit must be brought withinthree years of the date of the alleged injury. 16 Subsequently, sec-tion 9-1-51 of the Rhode Island General Laws extended the statuteof limitations to allow an action against the "perpetrator" to becommenced within seven years of when the victim discovered orshould have discovered that sexual assault had occurred. 17 Thisamendment did not serve to revise section 9-1-14 (b), which main-tains a three year statute of limitations for claims brought againstnon-perpetrators.' 8 Further, any claim that had expired by stat-9. See id.10. See id.11. See id. at 231-32.12. See id. at 232.13. See id.14. At the commencement of the action, Kenneth Smith was 32 years old,while Stephen and Michael Kelly were ages 32 and 26 respectively. See id.15. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14(b) (1956) (1997 Reenactment).16. See id.17. Id.18. See Kelly, 678 A.2d at 877.1999] 801802 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:605ute prior to the enactment of the amendment would not be revivedunder the new law.Tolling ProvisionsThe time period of limitations and the circumstances underwhich a claim is tolled must be assessed in determining if a claimfails due to statute of limitations expiration.The first tolling provision at issue is contained in section 9-1-19 which delays the period of limitations from applying to a minoruntil the minor reaches the age of majority. 19 The same statutealso prevents the period from running if the party seeking to bringthe claim was of "unsound mind."20 A third tolling provision atissue is provided for in section 9-1-20 which allows the cause ofaction to be brought when the harm was discovered; accrual of thestatute of limitations period does not begin on the actual date ofharm when the cause of action was fraudulently concealed. 21The hierarchy defendants did not contest that plaintiffs' periodof limitations did not begin until each individual reached twenty-one years of age.22 Defendants did vigorously challenge the fur-ther extension for the limitations period under both the "unsoundmind" and "fraudulent concealment" provisions of section 9-1-19and section 9-1-20, respectively.23ANALYSIS AND HOLDINGAll three plaintiffs filed suit in 1993, long after each had at-tained the age of majority. At the time of the alleged abuses, thethree year limitation set forth in section 9-1-14(b) of the Rhode Is-land General Laws governed such claims. 24 The amendments bysection 9-1-51, which extended the time period, did not come into19. See Smith, 997 F. Supp. at 232.20. Section 9-1-19 states:§ 9-1-19. Disability postponing running of statute.If any person at the time any such cause of action shall accrue to him orher shall be under the age of [twenty-one (21) years], or of unsound mind... the person may bring the cause of action, within the time limitedunder this chapter, after the impediment is removed.R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-19 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).21. See id. § 9-1-20.22. See Smith, 997 F. Supp. at 233.23. See id.24. See id.SURVEY SECTIONeffect until well after three years of all plaintiffs reaching agetwenty-one. 25 Accordingly, the statute could not be retroactivelyapplied to claims which were previously time barred.26 Since sec-tion 9-1-14 prevented their claims, plaintiffs sought an extension ofthe period of limitations via the "unsound mind" provision of sec-tion 9-1-19 and the "fraudulent concealment" provision of section9-1-20.27Unsound MindAlthough the statute does not explicitly define the term "un-sound mind," case law has shown that construction of the term forstatute of limitations tolling purposes includes consideration of"the historical categories of insanity, imprisonment, minority orabsence from the country."28 Plaintiffs sought to have the condi-tion of "repressed memory" included in the ascribed categories trig-gering tolling.29 In determining the boundaries of "unsoundmind," the court turned to the legislative history of section 9-1-19.An examination of the context and language revealed that the "un-sound mind" provision was to be narrowly construed; it "refer[s]only to conditions that render a person legally incompetent or inca-pable of managing his or her everyday affairs."30 Further, if thelegislature intended for the unsound mind provision to include acondition of repressed memory, it would have been superfluous toinclude a "discovery" provision in section 9-1-51.31 Finally, it wasclear from the legislature's omission of repressed memory from thelanguage of section 9-1-19 that such a condition was not encom-passed within the provision. This narrow construction was consis-tent with the Rhode Island Supreme Court's interpretations of the25. See id.26. Under the section 9-1-19 "minority" tolling provision, the statute of limita-tions expired for Kenneth Smith on April 10, 1984; Stephen Kelly on August 1,1985; and Michael Kelly on February 26, 1991.27. See Smith, 997 F. Supp. at 234-35.28. Young v. Park, 359 A.2d 697, 699 n.3 (R.I. 1976).29. Kenneth Smith asserted that the unsound mind exception was applicablebecause the trauma he experienced forced the repression of any memory of theassaults. The Kelly brothers also claimed that the exception applied to them fortwo reasons: first, they did not understand the wrongful nature of the conduct atthe time it occurred, and second, the traumatic experience of instituting suit wouldhave forced them to "re-live" the painful memories.30. Smith, 997 F. Supp. at 235.31. See id.1999] 803804 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:605term as well as those in numerous other jurisdictions. The courtdeferred to the legislature by applying the term's "common mean-ing" and declined to define the term differently for statute of limi-tations purposes. 32Accordingly, the court was unable to apply the "unsoundmind" provision to the conditions presented by the plaintiffs. Ken-neth Smith, noted the court, managed his daily affairs without suf-fering from any sort of disability.33  He also was neverinstitutionalized for any drug or mental problems, nor was he atany time placed under guardianship or conservatorship. 34 MichaelKelly's claim of unsound mind failed for similar reasons. The evi-dence showed he was an able, functioning individual who held sev-eral jobs and he was never subject to any medical or physicaltreatment.35 Stephen Kelly, despite his troubled life, also failed tomeet the established criteria. Like the other two plaintiffs, he wasat no time placed under guardianship or conservatorship. 36 Kelly'sdepression and concomitant difficulties evidenced an unsatisfac-tory life but did not rise to the legal standard required by section 9-1-19.37Fraudulent ConcealmentSection 9-1-20 allows the period of limitations to be tolled incases where the plaintiff was unaware that a cause of action ex-isted because the defendant fraudulently concealed it.38 In suchcases the period of limitations begins at the time the plaintiff dis-covers the existence of his or her cause of action, instead of fromthat date of actual injury.39 An extension of the limitations periodunder this tolling theory requires the plaintiff to show that the de-fendant made a misrepresentation of fact, and that such misrepre-sentation fraudulently concealed the existence of plaintiffs causeof action.40 The Rhode Island Supreme Court had previously con-strued "misrepresentation" to be "some representation or other af-32. See id. at 237-38.33. See id.34. See id.35. See id.36. See id. at 238.37. See id.38. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-20 (1956) (1996 Reenactment).39. See id.40, See id.SURVEY SECTIONfirmative conduct amounting in fact to such a representationwhich could reasonably deceive another and induce him to relythereon to his disadvantage. 4 1 A defendant declining to offer infor-mation that would assist in proving a plaintiffs cause of actiondoes not rise to the level of misrepresentation to be consideredfraudulent concealment;42 it must be shown that the defendant ac-tively mislead the plaintiff by misrepresenting material facts thatwould provide the basis for a cause of action. Further, the plaintiffmust show that the reliance on the misrepresentation was justifi-able, and led to the erroneous belief that no cause of actionexisted.' 3Plaintiffs' claims of fraudulent concealment against the hier-archy defendants rested on the dual assumption that the hierarchydefendants were both aware of the individual priests' behavior andfailed to report it, and that they engaged in a conspiracy to "cover-up" the assaults.44The arguments put forth by the plaintiffs were unclear as towhether the fraudulent concealment occurred before or after thealleged abuses. The court reasoned that if it were the former, thehierarchy defendants actions (or lack thereof) were irrelevant tothe determination that they concealed the existence of plaintiffscause of action after the abuses occurred.45 In the latter instance,several flaws would cause the claim to fail. First, the plaintiffsshowed no evidence in support of the allegation that the hierarchydefendants made misrepresentations to them.46 Indeed, plaintiffshad admitted that they had no communications with the hierarchydefendants. 47 They also had never shown any evidence linking thepost-abuse transfers of the individual priests to the concealment oftheir causes of action. 48 Also, section 9-1-20 was already construedto exclude the failure to volunteer information as an act of actualmisrepresentation; plaintiffs showed no evidence that such actionin their cases would give rise to a tolling of the limitations period.4941. Caianiello v. Shatkin, 82 A.2d 826, 829 (R.I. 1951).42. Kenyon v. United Elec. Ry. Co., 151 A. 5, 8 (R.I. 1930).43. Travers v. Spidell, 682 A.2d 471, 472-73 (R.I. 1976).44. See Smith v. O'Connell, 997 F. Supp. 226, 238-39 (D.R.I. 1998).45. See id. at 239.46. See id.47. See id.48. See id.49. See id.1999] 805806 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:605Plaintiffs further argued that the hierarchy defendants' si-lence did constitute an actual misrepresentation because the fail-ure to disclose knowledge of the priests' actions was a breach of thefiduciary relationship between the parties.50 In the absence of anysuch evidence, the court refused to infer the existence of a fiduciaryrelationship between the parties merely because plaintiffs hadsome kind of association with the churches in the past.51 Even ifsuch a relation did exist, it would not have imposed a duty on thehierarchy defendants to make disclosures following the abuse.5 2The duty of the churches would have been to prevent acts of abuse,not to volunteer after-the-fact information that would amount toan admission of liability. 53 Finally, the court rejected the plain-tiffs' argument because there was no evidence that the hierarchydefendants' actions concealed their causes of action. 54Plaintiffs asserted the fraudulent concealment argumentagainst Fr. Marcantonio also. The priest had told plaintiffs thathis actions were part of their religious training, thus causing theplaintiffs' mistaken belief that the actions were normal and accept-able. 55 Accordingly, plaintiffs alleged that there was no reason tobelieve a cause of action existed.5 6 The court rejected this claimbecause the statements, though dishonest and deplorable, were in-sufficient to support a fraudulent concealment claim.57 As a mat-ter of law, it was unreasonable for the plaintiffs, as competentadults, to have relied on such statements.58 Therefore, the claimsagainst Fr. Marcantonio were time barred since the three year lim-itations period had already run.59CONCLUSIONIn Smith u. O'Connell, the Rhode Island Supreme Court ap-plied the common meaning of "unsound mind" and found that theclaims in this case did not comport with the common usage of the50. See id.51. See id.52. See id at 240.53. See id.54. See id.55. See id.56. See id.57. See id. at 240-41.58. See id.59. See id.19991 SURVEY SECTION 807term for tolling purposes. In addition, the court rejected plaintiffs'claim of fraudulent concealment in that defendants' silence or fail-ure to offer information did not constitute actual misrepresenta-tion, and that plaintiffs' reliance on the defendant's statement wasnot reasonable. Therefore, the did not allow a tolling of the limita-tions period, and granted defendants' motion for summaryjudgment.Christopher H. Lordan

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1998 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Statute of Limitations

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