Rich, Lesley S.

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Roger Williams University Law ReviewVolume 2 | Issue 2 Article 15Spring 19971996 Survey of Rhode Island Law: cases: PublicImmunityLesley S. RichRoger Williams University School of LawFollow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LRThis Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion inRoger Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.Recommended CitationRich, Lesley S. (1997) "1996 Survey of Rhode Island Law: cases: Public Immunity," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 2: Iss.2, Article 15.Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol2/iss2/15SURVEY SECTIONPublic Immunity. St. James Condominium Ass'n v. Lokey, 676A.2d 1343 (R.I. 1996). Dismissal of action for failure to state aclaim is disfavored where defendant asserts immunity under pub-lic-duty doctrine, and where plaintiffs pleadings sufficiently allegethat a town owed a special duty.In St. James Condominium Ass'n v. Lokey, 1 the Rhode IslandSupreme Court reversed a superior court judgment that granted amotion to dismiss a negligence claim against a town and a buildinginspector. The supreme court held that dismissal for failure tostate a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6)2 was inappropriatewhere a town claimed immunity under the public-duty doctrine be-cause of the possibility of the existence of a special duty to theplaintiffs.3FACTS AND TRAVELPlaintiffs, owners of units in the St. James Condominium de-velopment in North Providence, sued the developer of the project,the architect, the warranty company, the Town of North Provi-dence (Town), and the building inspector alleging, inter alia, thatthe inspector had "negligently inspected or failed to inspect theplans and construction of the project and had negligently issuedoccupancy permits for units within the development."4 The com-plaint also charged the Town with liability for the negligence of itspublic officials under the doctrine of respondeat superior.5 TheTown and the building inspector filed a motion to dismiss claimingimmunity under the public-duty doctrine.6 In opposition to themotion, plaintiffs submitted an occupancy permit and an inspec-tion form for one of the condominium buildings that stated "[n]eedsmoke stops between units[,] [s]tairs need re-building no overhang1. 676 A.2d 1343 (L.I. 1996).2. A claim may be dismissed "for failure of the pleading to state a claim uponwhich relief can be granted." 1RI. Super. Ct. R Civ. P. 12(b)(6).3. St. James, 676 A.2d at 1347.4. Id. at 1344. Plaintiffs claimed that there were major defects in the build-ing including settling foundations, cracked walls, frozen pipes, a leaking roof, andimproper heating, and that the building inspector should have revealed the build-ing code violations. Id.5. The doctrine provides that a master is liable for the wrongful acts of hisservant. Black's Law Dictionary 1311 (6th ed. 1990).6. The public-duty doctrine protects governmental functions from tort liabil-ity. St. James, 676 A.2d at 1346.1997] 485486 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:485Boiler rooms." 7 The defendants' motion was granted, and plaintiffsappealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court claiming that thespecial duty exception to the public-duty doctrine applied to thiscase, and dismissal was an abuse of discretion."BACKGROUTNDIn several prior cases, the Rhode Island Supreme Court heldthat the "public-duty doctrine protects the state and its politicalsubdivisions from tort liability arising out of the performance ofgovernmental functions not commonly undertaken by private enti-ties."9 An exception to the public-duty doctrine existed where thegovernmental unit owed a special duty to an individual instead ofthe public in general.10 Plaintiffs could show a special duty if therehad been "some form of prior contact with state or municipal offi-cials 'who then knowingly embarked on a course of conduct thatendangered the plaintiffs, or they [knew] that the injury to thatparticularly identified plaintiff can be or should have beenforeseen.'" 'Another exception to the public-duty doctrine is created wherethe state's actions are so extreme that it would not be necessary fora plaintiff to show that the government owed them a specialduty. 2 In Haley v. Town of Lincoln,13 the court noted that itwould be virtually impossible for a defendant to sustain its burdenin a motion to dismiss under either Rule 12(c) or 12(b)(6) becauseof the possibility of these exceptions.' 4 A motion to dismiss under7. Id. at 1345.8. Id.9. Id. at 1346 (citing Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 849 (R.I. 1992);Bierman v. Shookster, 590 K-2d 402, 403 (R.I. 1991)). The intent of the doctrine isto "encourage the effective administration of governmental operations by removingthe threat of potential litigation." Haley, 611 A.2d at 849 (citing Catone v.Medberry, 555 A.2d 328, 333 (R.I. 1989)).10. St. James, 676 A.2d at 1346 (citing Haley, 611 A.2d at 849; Ryan v. StateDep't of Transp., 420 A.2d 841, 843 (R.I. 1980)).11. IM at 1345 (quoting Quality Court Condominium Assn v. Quality HillDev. Corp., 641 A.2d 746, 750 (R.I. 1985)).12. Haley, 611 A.2d at 849 (citing Verity v. Danti, 585 A.2d 65 (LI. 1991)).This exception, known as the egregious conduct exception, was not claimed as adefense in St. James.13. 611 A.2d 845 (IL 1992).14. St. James, 676 A-2d at 1346 (quoting Haley, 611 A.2d at 849). The court inHaley was referring to Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure 12(c),which is a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Rule 12(b)(6), which is a1997] SURVEY SECTION 487Rule 12(b)(6) "assumes the allegations contained in the complaintto be true and views the facts in the light most favorable to theplaintiffs."15 It would be a rare circumstance when the pleadingsare viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff that suchmotions could succeed.' 6 "[S]uch a motion should not be granted'unless it appears to a certainty that [the plaintiffs] will not be en-titled to relief under any set of facts which might be proved in sup-port of [their] claim.' " 17ANALysIs AND HOLDINGIn St. James, the Rhode Island Supreme Court first had to de-termine whether the trial judge had considered the defendants'motion to dismiss as a failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule12(b)(6), or as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.18 Inthis regard, the court noted that although the plaintiffs submittedtwo documents extrinsic to the pleadings, the motion judge "madeno reference to the matters outside the pleadings when she ruledon the motion."' 9 On this basis, the court reviewed the judgment asa judgment to dismiss, and next considered the question ofwhether the dismissal was proper. 20motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted"Haley, 611 A.2d at 850 n.2.15. St. James, 676 A.2d at 1346 (citing Builders Specialty Co. v. Goulet, 639A.2d 59, 60 (RI. 1994); Ellis v. Rhode Island Pub. Transit Auth., 586 A.2d 1055,1057 (RI. 1991)).16. Id. at 1347.17. Id. (quoting Bragg v. Warwick Shoppers World, Inc., 227 A.2d 582, 584(RLI. 1967)).18. "If on a motion [under 12(b)(6)] to dismiss for failure of the pleading tostate a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading arepresented to and not excluded by the court, [it] shall be treated as one for summaryjudgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." R.I. Super. Ct R. Civ. P.12(bX6).19. St. James, 676 A.2d at 1345. This dispute arose because the defendantsargued that the motion as granted was actually one for summary judgment,although they had written the order (including the caption), that the trial judgesigned. As the Rhode Island Supreme Court pointed out in its opinion, not only didthe judge not reference these documents in her opinion, "[t~he plaintiffs... werenot notified, as required by Rule 12(b)(6), that defendants' motion was being con-verted into a motion for summary judgment." IM at 1345-46. When a motion todismiss is treated as a motion for summary judgment, "'all parties shall be givenreasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such motion byRule 56." IM at 1345 (quoting lI. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).20. Id.488 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:485In considering whether to affirm the motion to dismiss pursu-ant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Rhode Island Supreme Court relied on itsprior holdings regarding the public immunity defense.2 ' The courtdid not depart from the test it had articulated in Bragg v. WarwickShoppers World, Inc.,22 which stated that a motion for dismissalunder Rule 12(b)(6) "should not be granted 'unless it appears to acertainty that [the plaintiffs] will not be entitled to relief under anyset of facts which might be proved in support of [their] claim.'" 23The court affirmed that motions to dismiss based on the public-duty doctrine are especially disfavored. 24The court noted that there was enough ambiguity in the recordto question whether the plaintiffs could show that defendants owedthem a special duty.25 Relying on Haley, the court said that "[i]t ispossible to conceive of fact[s] that, if proven... at trial, could es-tablish the existence of a special duty owed by a defendant to thatplaintiff" 26 The court went on to note that the plaintiffs' complaintindicated several incidents wherein the defendant building inspec-tor had failed in his duty to properly inspect the construction, hadnoted code violations, and yet had issued occupancy permits "whenhe knew or should have known they were in violation of the appro-priate building codes."27 Finally, the court noted that even though"these allegations are insufficient to establish the existence of aspecial duty, they do not preclude the possibility that such a dutyexisted."28In reversing the motion judge's ruling, the court stated thatbecause this case did "not present one of the rare circumstances inwhich the plaintiffs' pleadings leave no doubt whatsoever that[they] could not succeed at trial. Consequently, dismissal pursu-ant to Rule 12(b)(6) was inappropriate." 29 In his concurrence, Jus-21. Id. at 1345-46.22. 227 A.2d 582 (R.I. 1967).23. St. James, 676 A2d at 1346 (quoting Bragg, 227 A.2d at 584).24. Id. at 1346 (citing Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 849-50 (R.I.1992)).25. Id.26. Id.27. Id. at 1347. The complaint further alleged, in part, that the "building in-spector had failed to examine plans and specifications... failed to make... properand thorough inspections, [and] negligently approved plans and specificationswhich did not meet building code requirements.'" Id-28. Id.29. Id-SURVEY SECTIONtice Flanders somewhat softened the apparent harshness of thisruling by emphasizing that although dismissal on the pleadingsmay not be easily obtained where defendants plead the public-dutydoctrine, a motion for summary judgment may be an "expeditiousrecourse short of trial to test whether a claim is barred by the pub-lic-duty doctrine."30CONCLUSIONWhile this case does not depart from the supreme court's priorrulings on the issue of rule 12(b)(6) dismissal where defendant as-serts immunity under the public-duty doctrine, it does appear tosignal that a defendant may be more likely to prevail in a motionfor summary judgment. State and municipal defendants shouldprobably avoid Rule 12(b)(6) motions unless the pleadings stronglyshow the nonexistence of a public-duty exception. Defendantsmight be better advised to seek a motion for summary judgmentafter discovery, where extrinsic documentation would allow a mo-tion judge a fuller examination of the record.Lesley S. Rich30. Id. (Flanders, J., concurring).1997] 489

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