Beauchesne, Melissa Coulombe

English

HELIN Digital Commons

1999 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Labor Law/Municipal Law

DOCS@RWU

Roger Williams University Law ReviewVolume 5 | Issue 2 Article 23Spring 20001999 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: LaborLaw/Municipal LawMelissa Coulombe BeauchesneRoger Williams University School of LawFollow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LRThis Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion inRoger Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.Recommended CitationBeauchesne, Melissa Coulombe (2000) "1999 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Labor Law/Municipal Law ," Roger WilliamsUniversity Law Review: Vol. 5: Iss. 2, Article 23.Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol5/iss2/23772 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:601Labor Law/Municipal Law .Providence Lodge No. 3, FraternalOrder of Police v. City of Providence, 730 A.2d 17 (R.I. 1999). Adecision of an arbitration panel is only reviewable by writ of certio-rari to the Rhode Island Supreme Court and therefore a superiorcourt is without jurisdiction over such a matter. An arbitrationpanel has the authority to modify cost of living adjustments(COLA) prospectively, irrespective of a consent decree. However,arbitrators must make an independent judgment as to whether acity has the ability to pay a COLA other than the one proposed bythe city. Furthermore, an arbitration panel does not exceed its ju-risdiction in awarding COLAs that differ from the COLA specifiedin an ordinance.Providence Lodge No. 3, Fraternal Order of Police v. City ofProvidence' consists of two consolidated cases.2 In each case, theCity of Providence (City) filed petitions for writ of certiorari andraised issues in regards to arbitration awards that resulted fromtwo separate contract disputes.3 One of the disputes was betweenthe City and Providence Lodge No. 3, Fraternal Order of Police(FOP) and the other involved the City and the Firefighters' UnionLocal 799 (Local 799).4FACTS AND TRAVELIn both of the cases consolidated for appeal, the parties se-lected a panel to arbitrate contract proposals, the first a contractproposal set forth by the FOP, and the second a contract disputeinvolving Local 799.5 Both panels awarded COLAs to each unionirrespective of the COLAs proposed by the City.6 Pursuant to theMunicipal Police Arbitration Act (MPAA)7 and the Fire FightersArbitration Act (FFAA),s the arbitration panel awarded the FOP afive percent COLA9 and Local 799 a six percent COLA.' 0 The City1. 730 A.2d 17 (R.I. 1999).2. See id. at 18.3. See id.4. See id.5. See id.6. See id.7. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-2 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).8. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-1 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).9. It is noted that five percent was chosen because this was in accordancewith the COLA in a previous agreement for the period of 1989-1991. See Provi-dence Lodge No. 3, 730 A.2d at 18.SURVEY SECTIONonly proposed a COLA of three percent, which was in accordancewith a consent decree entered in December 1991.11The 1991 consent decree was instated subsequent to a decisionby the Retirement Board to increase COLAs for all employees. 12 In1992, in the case of Betz v. Paolino,13 the Rhode Island SupremeCourt stated that "the city council alone has the authority toamend pension benefits under the retirement provision of the citycharter."14 In 1994, the city council amended its retirement ordi-nance to reflect a three percent COLA. 15 This amendment modi-fied the agreed upon COLAs set in the 1991 consent decree. 16The City appealed the arbitration panels' decisions regardingthe FOP to the superior court.17 The superior court confirmed thepolice award.' Thereafter, the City appealed the superior court'saffirmance of the FOP award, and also sought review of arbitrationawards made regarding the Local 799 contract dispute.' 9ANALYSIS AND HOLDINGAlthough the only aspect of the arbitration panels' awardschallenged by the City were the COLAs involved, a number ofother issues arose for the court to decide. 20 The first issue theRhose Island Supreme Court addressed was the City's argumentthat the superior court did not have jurisdiction to affirm theFOP's arbitration award.21 The Rhode Island Supreme Court heldthat the superior court did not have jurisdiction to review the arbi-tration decision in light of section 28-9.1-15 of the Rhode IslandGeneral Laws.22 The court found this statute to be unequivocal inits declaration that an arbitration panel's decision is only review-10. See id.11. See id. at 19.12. See id.13. 605 A.2d 837 (R.I. 1992).14. Providence Lodge No. 3, 730 A.2d at 19 (citing Betz v. Paolino, 605 A.2d837, 839-40 (R.I. 1992)).15. See id.16. See id.17. See id. at 18.18. See id.19. See id.20. See id.21. See id.22. See id; R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9.1-15 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).2000]774 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:601able under the FFAA and the MPAA by writ of certiorari to theRhode Island Supreme Court.23Secondly, the court addressed whether or not the arbitrationpanel had the authority to modify the COLA for the two unions.24The court held that the 1991 consent decree did not preclude thecity council or an arbitration panel from modifying the COLA pro-spectively.25 The court declared that this decision was consistentwith its earlier holding in Betz v. Paolino.26Next, the court considered whether or not the arbitrationpanel had the power to make an independent judgment about theCOLA to be assessed for the new contract year.27 After concludingthat the arbitration panel did have that authority, the supremecourt found that the arbitrators erred because they failed to makean independent judgment regarding the ability of the City to pay aCOLA irrespective of the COLA that the City has proposed.28Finally, the court addressed whether the FFAA and MPAAacts or an inconsistent home rule charter provision would apply ininterest arbitration procedures. 29 The court decided that an ordi-nance adopted pursuant to a city's charter provisions does not limitan interest arbitration panel as a state statute could. 30 Similarly,the court held that the charter provision does not supersede theFFAA or the MPAA.31 In unison with prior decisions,32 the courtfound the FFAA and the MPAA to be acts of general applicationsince they apply equally to all cities and towns, despite the factthat they may vary from one municipality to another. 33 As a re-sult, these acts of general application were held to supersede anyinconsistent home charter rules.3 423. See Providence Lodge No. 3, 730 A.2d at 18.24. See id. at 18-19.25. See id. at 19.26. 605 A.2d at 839-40 (finding that the retirement provision of the city char-ter gives the city council the sole authority to amend pension benefits).27. See Providence Lodge No. 3, 730 A.2d at 19.28. See id.29. See id. at 19-20.30. See id. at 20.31. See id.32. See, e.g., Town of Lincoln v. Lincoln Lodge No. 22, 660 A.2d 710, 719 (R.I.1995); City of Cranston v. Hall, 354 A.2d 415, 417 (R.I. 1976); Marro v. GeneralTreasurer of Cranston, 273 A.2d 660, 662 (R.I. 1971); Opinion to the House of Rep-resentatives, 87 A.2d 693, 696 (R.I. 1952).33. See Providence Lodge No. 3, 730 A.2d at 20.34. See id.SURVEY SECTIONTherefore, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sustained theCity's appeal of an earlier arbitration award, in part, on the failureof the superior court to properly procure jurisdiction to confirm orvacate the award. The court also found that this arbitration panelfailed to exercise independent judgment and thus granted the peti-tions for certiorari and remanded the questions to the respectivepanels for an application of independent judgment.CONCLUSIONIn Providence Lodge No. 3, Fraternal Order of Police v. City ofProvidence, the supreme court held that an interest arbitrationpanel does have the authority to award COLAS, but that an arbi-tration panel must exercise its independent judgment in determin-ing a city's ability to pay a COLA other than that proposed by acity. The court also determined that that an arbitration panel orthe city may prospectively modify a COLA. In addition, the courtheld that decisions of an arbitration panel under the FFAA and theMPAA are only reviewable by petition for writ of certiorari to theRhode Island Supreme Court. Finally, the court concluded thatthe FFAA and the MPAA are acts of general application and there-fore supersede an inconsistent home rule charter provision.Melissa Coulombe Beauchesne20001

https://docs.rwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1154&amp;context=rwu_LR

1999 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Labor Law/Municipal Law

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

HELIN Digital Commons

DOCS@RWU