Marsella, Russell P.

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Roger Williams University Law ReviewVolume 5 | Issue 2 Article 14Spring 20001999 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases:Consumer ProtectionRussell P. MarsellaRoger Williams University School of LawFollow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LRThis Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion inRoger Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.Recommended CitationMarsella, Russell P. (2000) "1999 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Consumer Protection ," Roger Williams University Law Review:Vol. 5: Iss. 2, Article 14.Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol5/iss2/14SURVEY SECTIONConsumer Protection. Schram v. Burrillville Chevrolet, Inc.,728 A.2d 457 (R.I. 1999). Under the Rhode Island Lemon Law, les-sees of an allegedly defective motor vehicle may institute a cause ofaction against both the manufacturer of the vehicle and the manu-facturer's authorized dealership. In addition, lessees may returnthe vehicle to the dealership, as returning the vehicle to the manu-facturer will often be impracticable.FACTS AND TRAVELOn May 9, 1996, plaintiffs Alice A. Schram and James M.Schram (the Schrams) leased a new 1996 Chevrolet Blazer fromdefendant dealership, Burrillville Chevrolet, Inc. (the dealership).'The dealership was an authorized representative of the vehicle'smanufacturer, General Motors Corporation. 2 Due to excessive oilconsumption, the Schrams brought the vehicle back to dealershipfor repairs on at least four occasions. 3 Claiming that the dealer-ship failed to solve the vehicle's oil problem, the Schrams filed acomplaint against the dealership and General Motors Corp., basedon the Rhode Island Lemon Law4 and the Deceptive Trade Prac-tices Act.5The dealership filed a motion to dismiss the Schram's com-plaint, arguing that the dealership's duty under both statutoryprovisions was limited to the making of repairs, while full liabilityrested with the manufacturer. 6 The superior court granted thedealership's motion.7 The Schrams appealed, arguing that the rul-ing, by forcing them to return the vehicle to General Motors in De-troit, Michigan, would severely undercut one of the main purposesof the Lemon Law, "namely, to provide an expeditious and reason-able remedy to consumers."8 They then amended their complaint,alleging that both the dealership and General Motors violated theLemon Law and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act "by failing torepair the SUV in conformity to the warranties, by refusing to ac-cept the return of their SUV, and by failing to refund the trade-in1. See Schram v. Burrillville Chevrolet, Inc., 728 A.2d 457, 458 (R.I. 1999).2. See id.3. See id.4. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 31-5.2-2, -3, and -5 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).5. R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1 (1956) (1992 Reenactment).6. See Schram, 728 A.2d at 458-59.7. See id. at 459.8. Id.20001 675676 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:601allowance and other expenses they incurred during the term of thelease."9ANALYSIS AND HOLDINGThe Rhode Island Supreme Court resolved the dispute by as-certaining the intent of the legislature. The court made note thatalthough it typically construes a statute by examining the lan-guage, nature and object of the statute, it will not construe a stat-ute literally if the underlying purpose of the statute is therebydefeated or an absurd result is reached. 10The court then cited two relevant provisions of the LemonLaw. Section 31-5.2-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws statesthat "[ilf a vehicle does not conform to any applicable express orimplied warranties. .. and the consumer or lessee reports the non-conformity to the manufacturer of the vehicle, its agent, or its au-thorized dealer ... [they] shall effect such repairs as necessary toconform the vehicle to the warranty."" Section 31-5.2-3 of theRhode Island General Laws states that "[ilf the manufacturer, itsagent, or its authorized dealer or lessor does not conform the motorvehicle to any applicable express or implied warranty.., the man-ufacturer shall accept return of the vehicle," and refund the fullcontract price or lease price, with some adjustments for trade-insand usage.12Based on these two provisions of the Lemon Law, the dealer-ship argued that while it had an obligation to make the necessaryrepairs, which it claimed to have fulfilled, any liability for noncon-formance is imposed on the manufacturer. 13 However, the RhodeIsland Supreme Court disagreed with the dealership's reading ofthe statutes.The court found that construing the language to require theconsumer to return a nonconforming vehicle solely at its place ofbusiness and not to an authorized dealership located in this state"would violate the Legislature's intent and effectuate an absurd re-sult."' 4 The court noted that in the case of imported vehicles, "con-9. Id.10. See id.11. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-5.2-2 (1956) (1994 Reenactment)).12. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-5.2-3 (1956) (1994 Reenactment)).13. See id. at 460.14. Id.SURVEY SECTIONsumers might have to return the vehicle to Japan, Germany, oreven Yugoslavia.... " 15 Though the dealership may not be liablefor refunding or replacing a nonconforming vehicle, it can still actas a conduit or agent for the manufacturer. 16 This interpretationdoes not violate the language of the statute, which imposes liabilitysolely on the manufacturer.' 7 "Moreover, if the dealer could haveand should have cured the nonconforming vehicle by properly per-forming repairs to it, then the dealer may be liable in any event forfailing to fulfill its legal obligations under the Lemon Law." i8Therefore, it was error for the trial court to dismiss the dealer-ship from any lawsuit based on the Lemon Law on the groundsthat it cannot find the dealer liable for refunding the purchaseprice or replacing the nonconforming vehicle.19 In a typical situa-tion, the dealer will be a necessary party to any relief that theselaws may afford. 20CONCLUSIONIn Schram v. Burrillville Chevrolet, Inc., the Rhode IslandSupreme Court held that the lessee of a defective motor vehiclecould return such a vehicle to the dealership where it was leasedand serviced as an agent of the manufacturer under the LemonLaw. As far as consumers are concerned, the dealership, as theagent of the manufacturer, acts as the manufacturer for purposesof securing the manufacturer's compliance with the Lemon Law.Russell P. Marsella15. Id.16. See id.17. See id.18. Id.19. See id.20. See id. at 461.20001

1999 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Consumer Protection

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1999 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Consumer Protection

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