Stockwell, Joshua A.

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Roger Williams University Law ReviewVolume 8 | Issue 2 Article 7Spring 20032002 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: AntitrustJoshua A. StockwellRoger Williams University School of LawFollow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LRThis Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion inRoger Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.Recommended CitationStockwell, Joshua A. (2003) "2002 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Antitrust," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 8: Iss. 2,Article 7.Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol8/iss2/7426 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:421Antitrust. Siena v. Microsoft Corp., 796 A.2d 461 (R.I. 2002).The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the plaintiff ownersand lessees were indirect purchasers that lacked standing to sueunder the Antitrust Act, and neither the end user license agree-ment nor the consumer warranty vested them with standing to sueas direct purchasers.FACTS AND TRAVELThe plaintiffs sued Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft) for anticompeti-tive practices in violation of Rhode Island's Antitrust Act.' Theplaintiffs alleged that Microsoft unlawfully used its monopolypower to set prices for its Windows 98 operating system far exceed-ing what it could charge in a competitive market.2 None of theplaintiffs, however, purchased or leased their Windows 98 softwaredirectly from Microsoft.3 The superior court dismissed the com-plaint for lack of standing to bring suit under the Antitrust Act.4The hearing justice determined that indirect purchasers werebarred from bringing suits alleging antitrust violations in view ofthe United States Supreme Court's ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v.Illinois,5 and that Microsoft's End User License Agreement did notcreate a direct relationship between the plaintiffs and Microsoft.6ANALYSIS AND HOLDINGThe Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that section 6-36-2 ofthe Antitrust Act specifically requires that the Act be construed inharmony with federal antitrust law unless the provisions were ex-pressly contrary to one another.7 In Illinois Brick Co., the UnitedStates Supreme Court held that indirect purchasers were barredfrom bringing antitrust suits because the Court did not want tobecome involved in determining which purchasers in a chain suf-fered harm and the extent of harm they suffered.8 Furthermore,the court noted that the plaintiffs were not entirely without rem-1. Siena v. Microsoft Corp., 796 A.2d 461, 462 (R.I. 2002) (citing R.I. GEN.LAWS § 6-36-1 et seq. (2000)).2. Id.3. Id. at 463.4. Id.5. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).6. Siena, 796 A.2d at 463 (citing § 6-36-2).7. Id. at 464.8. Id. (citing Illinois Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 744-46).SURVEY SECTIONedy because under section 6-36-12, the attorney general has theright to sue on behalf of indirect purchasers as parens patriae.9Because the plaintiffs did not purchase their Windows 98 softwaredirectly from Microsoft, they lacked standing to bring suit.1°Even though Microsoft required the plaintiffs to agree toMicrosoft's End User License Agreement before the plaintiffs coulduse Windows 98, and gave a consumer warranty directly to theplaintiffs, this relationship did not create direct purchaser privitybetween Microsoft and the plaintiffs.11 The court noted that thelicense agreement was only an agreement not to infringeMicrosoft's copyright, and that the consumer warranty is a com-mon service provided by manufacturers to end users of their prod-ucts. 12 The enormous amount of legal exposure created byadopting an exception for seller's employing such licenses and war-ranties, led the court to conclude that the Supreme Court could nothave intended such consequences from its holding in Illinois BrickCo. 1 3CONCLUSIONThe Rhode Island Supreme Court held that indirect purchas-ers of products lacked standing to sue under Rhode Island's Anti-trust Act. Furthermore, the granting of a consumer warranty oruse of a licensing agreement did not change the character of therelationship into that of a direct purchaser with standing to sue.Because the plaintiffs in this case were indirect purchasers, thetrial justice's grant of summary judgment to Microsoft was correct.Joshua A. Stockwell9. Id. at 464-65.10. Id. at 465.11. Id.12. Id.13. Id.20031

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