Quigley, Mark R.

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1997 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Attorney-Client

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Roger Williams University Law ReviewVolume 3 | Issue 2 Article 6Spring 19981997 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases:Attorney-ClientMark R. QuigleyRoger Williams University School of LawFollow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LRThis Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion inRoger Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.Recommended CitationQuigley, Mark R. (1998) "1997 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Attorney-Client," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 3:Iss. 2, Article 6.Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol3/iss2/6SURVEY SECTIONAttorney-Client. Vallinoto v. DiSandro, 688 A.2d 830 (R.I. 1997).A negligence-based legal malpractice claim requires proof that theattorney's services departed from the standard of care owed to hisclient and the client's legal position was damaged as a result of theattorney's behavior.In Vallinoto v. DiSandro,' the Rhode Island Supreme Courtheld that the plaintiff, whose divorce attorney had allegedly com-pelled her to engage in sexual contacts an estimated 200 times, 2was required to produce evidence at trial that the defendant attor-ney had departed from the duty of care owed to his client and theplaintiffs legal position was damaged as a result of the attorney'sbehavior.3 The plaintiffs failure to produce evidence that the de-fendant's legal services departed from the requisite standard ofcare and failure to demonstrate actual damages each required adirected verdict for the defendant.4FACTS AND TRAVELIn May of 1987, Maria Del Rosario Vallinoto (Vallinoto), theplaintiff, retained Edmond A. DiSandro (DiSandro), the defendant,to represent her in a divorce action brought by her husband.5 InAugust of 1987, Vallinoto and Disandro became involved in an inti-mate physical relationship.6 DiSandro claimed that the relation-ship was consensual, while Vallinoto claimed that the encounterswere coerced by DiSandro's threats to withdraw from representa-tion.7 DiSandro allegedly stated that if he withdrew from repre-senting Vallinoto, then she would be unable to retain a newattorney,8 and the likely outcomes would be loss of child custodyand deportation. 9 The relationship lasted approximately eighteenmonths and included an estimated 200 intimate encounters.101. 688 A.2d 830 (R.I. 1997).2. See id. at 833.3. See id. at 834.4. See id. at 836.5. See id. at 832-33.6. See id. at 833.7. See id.8. See id. (stating that DiSandro was the third attorney to represent Valli-noto in the divorce action).9. See id. (stating that Vallinoto was a citizen of Spain at the time).10. See id. at 833.1998] 393394 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:387When Vallinoto's divorce became final in early 1989, DiSan-dro's sexual and legal relationships with his client had ended."Vallinoto described DiSandro's legal representation throughoutthe divorce action as "excellent."12 She subsequently returned toDiSandro for additional legal services "long after"13 her divorcewas final and the alleged coerced sexual relations had ceased.14Vallinoto brought suit against DiSandro in January of 1991,alleging negligence-based legal malpractice and intentional inflic-tion of emotional distress. 15 A claim of legal malpractice basedupon a breach of fiduciary obligations was not included. 16 A juryreturned a general verdict for Vallinoto which included compensa-tory and punitive damages.' 7 DiSandro appealed, contending thatthe plaintiffs failure to show that she was damaged as a result ofhis legal services precluded the jury's finding of legalmalpractice.' 8BACKGROUNDIn Evora v. Henry,19 the Rhode Island Supreme Court adoptedthe generally accepted rule that a plaintiff in a legal-malpracticecase must prove that the attorney's negligence was the proximatecause of his or her damages. 20 This position was later reaffirmedin Scunio Motors, Inc. v. Teverow. 21In Suppressed v. Suppressed,22 the Appellate Court of Illinoisreviewed a legal-malpractice complaint concerning a divorce attor-ney's sexual relations with his client.23 The court refused to findlegal malpractice based upon the existence of the relationship, rea-soning that a legal cause of action should not be created solely be-ll. See id. at 834.12. Id. at 836.13. Id.14. See id. at 834.15. See id.16. See id. at 837.17, See id. at 834.18. See id. The Rhode Island Supreme Court publicly censured DiSandro forhis conduct in separate proceedings. See In re DiSandro, 680 A.2d 73 (R.I. 1996).19. 559 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 1989)20. See id. at 1040.21. 635 A.2d 268, 269 (R.I. 1993).22. 565 N.E.2d 101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).23. See id. at 102.SURVEY SECTIONcause one of the parties to a sexual relationship is an attorney.24The court determined the issue of whether such conduct was anactionable breach of ethics for the attorney was best left to thestate bar.25 Finally, the court noted that, even if it had determinedthat the attorney's conduct was a breach of the fiduciary relation-ship to his client, the client had failed to allege actual damages inher complaint. 26In McDaniel v. Gile,27 the California Court of Appeal revieweda complaint alleging that a divorce attorney withheld legal servicesfrom his client when she refused to submit to the attorney's sexualadvances. 28 The complaint alleged actual damages as a result.29The court declined to adopt a cause of action for legal malpracticebased on sexual relations between the attorney and his or her cli-ent, but did find that the withholding of legal services was a breachof the attorney's fiduciary obligation.30ANALysis AND HOLDINGIn Vallinoto, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed theduty that arises from the attorney-client relationship. The courtstated that "in essential part" the duty includes competent legalrepresentation, including the utilization of legal knowledge, skill,thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary to protect andadvance the client's interest.3'24. See id. at 106.25. See id. at 105. ABA Formal Opinion 92-364 reviews attorney-client sexualrelationships. The opinion notes four potential risks to the attorney-client relation-ship. First, the relationship may result from the attorney's exploitation of the cli-ent's vulnerability and constitute a breach of the fiduciary obligation to the client.Second, the relationship may deprive the lawyer of independent judgement. Third,the relationship creates a potential conflict of interest. Finally, the relationshipmay risk attorney-client confidences, as the courts will only respect those conver-sations that occur in the attorney-client setting, and not those that occur as part ofthe personal relationship. The committee concluded that the attorney is "well ad-vised to refrain from such a relationship." See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-364 (1992).26. See Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d at 105-06.27. 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Cl. Ct. App. 1991).28. See id.29. See id. at 245-46.30. See id. at 249.31. Vallinoto, 688 A.2d at 834 (citing R.I. Sup. Ct. Rules of Professional Con-duct Rule 1.1, art. V).3951998]396 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:387In reviewing aspects of Vallinoto and DiSandro's attorney-cli-ent relationship, the court distinguished McDaniel v. Gile by not-ing there was no evidence that DiSandro's legal services werecontingent upon the ongoing sexual relations with his client.32 Val-linoto "clearly had the ability and knowledge"33 to discontinue theattorney-client relationship at any time if she had become dissatis-fied with DiSandro's legal representation." Vallinoto herself de-scribed DiSandro's legal representation as "excellent."35 The courtcharacterized the results of Vallinoto's divorce as "more than shehad ever anticipated."36 As further evidence that Vallinoto wassatisfied with DiSandro's legal representation, the court noted thatshe returned to him for legal services after both the divorce actionand the sexual relationship ended.37 The court concluded thatDiSandro's legal services met the standards required by the profes-sion.38 The absence of any actual damages mandated a directedverdict for DiSandro on the claim of negligence-based legalmalpractice.39The court further refused to create a private cause of actionbased on DiSandro's violation of the Rules of Professional Con-duct,40 noting a that "clear and unanimous judicial rule"41 existsprohibiting a negligence claim for breach of a fiduciary duty basedsolely upon a professional code violation. 42 The Rules of Profes-sional Conduct themselves specifically state that a "violation...should not give rise to a cause of action."43 The court followed theholdings of other jurisdictions44 and its own professional code in32. See id. at 835.33. Id. at 835.34. See id.35. Id. at 836.36. Id.37. See id. at 834.38. See id. at 836.39. See id. Vallinoto received an increase in child-support payments, custodyof her daughter, 60% of marital assets, priceless paintings and heirlooms, and at-torney's fees in the final divorce decree. See id. at 833.40. See In re DiSandro, 680 A.2d 73 (R.I. 1996). The court found DiSandro hadviolated Rule 1.7(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits conflictsof interest. See id. at 74.41. Vallinoto, 688 A.2d at 837.42. See id.43, Id. at 838 (citing R.I. Sup. Ct. Rules of Professional Conduct Preamble,art. V).44. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.SURVEY SECTIONreaching this conclusion. The case was remanded for a new trialbased upon the plaintiffs claim that DiSandro's conduct consti-tuted intentional infliction of emotional distress.45CONCLUSIONThe court separated DiSandro's legal representation from hissexual relationship with his client. Analyzing his service as an at-torney, the court found that DiSandro's legal representation metthe required standards. The plaintiff herself described the serviceas excellent, and did not claim that any damages arose from herattorney's legal representation.The court determined that the occurrence of sexual relationsbetween an attorney and his client did not create a cause of actionbased solely on the defendant's status as an attorney. Althoughcritical of DiSandro's action as a professional, the court refused tocreate a private cause of action based on his unprofessional con-duct. The defendant's claim of intentional infliction of emotionaldistress survived the defendant's appeal, and the case was re-manded for a new trial.Mark R. Quigley45. See id. at 842.1998]

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1997 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Attorney-Client

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