In this paper I scrutinize three sets of passages by David Hume. The first is from the Introduction to A Treatise of Human Nature; the second is from the ‘An Abstract of a Book lately Published, entitled, A Treatise of Human Nature,’; the third is really a collection of widely scattered vignettes from The History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688 (1754-1762). I argue that in these works Hume creates several distinct intellectual traditions leading up to him. I argue that the changes among them reflect, in part, tactical moves in response to changed circumstances and, in part, Hume’s changed understanding of the epistemic virtues underlying his project’s relationship to the ‘system’ of science. For example, I trace how high praise for Bacon and Locke gets replaced by praise for Galileo, Boyle, and Newton. While this little noticed aspect of Hume’s thought has independent interest, focusing on Hume’s historiographical strategy also helps illuminate Hume’s evolving understanding of the ‘science of man’ within the system of sciences
