Internal corporate governance structures and firm financial performance: evidence from South African listed firms

Abstract

This thesis contains the findings of an examination of the relationship between internal corporate governance structures and the financial performance of South African listed firms. Specifically, using a sample of 100 South African listed firms from 2002 to 2006 (a total of 500 firm-year observations) and corporate governance data collected directly from company annual reports, the thesis seeks to ascertain whether better-governed listed firms tend to be associated with higher financial returns than their poorly-governed counterparts. Unlike prior studies, the internal corporate governance-financial performance nexus is investigated by applying both the compliance-index and equilibrium-variable research methodologies. The results based on the compliance-index model suggest that there is a statistically significant and positive association between the quality of the sampled firms’ internal corporate governance structures and their financial performance. This finding is robust whether an accounting (return on assets) or a market (Tobin’s Q) based measure of financial performance is used. Distinct from prior studies, an analysis of the impact of complying with the South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions on the financial performance of South African listed firms is also investigated. The results indicate that compliance with the affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions impacts positively on the performance of South African listed firms. By contrast, the results based on the equilibrium-variable model are generally mixed. First, regardless of the financial performance measure used, board diversity, the frequency of board meetings, and the establishment of board committees except the presence of a nomination committee seem to have no impact on firm financial performance. Second, board size is statistically significant and positively associated with Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), but statistically insignificant and negatively related to return on assets (ROA). Third, role or CEO duality is statistically significant and positively related to ROA, but statistically insignificant and negatively associated with the Q-ratio. Director shareownership is statistically insignificant and positively related to ROA, but statistically significant and negatively associated with the Q-ratio. Finally, the findings based on both the director shareownership squared and cubed do not support the statistically significant non-linear director shareownership-financial performance association reported by Morck et al. (1988). The findings from a series of robustness or sensitivity analyses carried out suggest that the empirical results reported are generally robust to potential endogeneity problems