What's worse than Al-Qaeda? Swarms of Terrorist Cells Op-Ed (reprinted version of "A Leaner, Meaner Jihad," which appeared in the New York Times on 16 March 2004)

Scott Atran

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Research Papers in Economics

Op-Ed Contributor: A Leaner, Meaner Jihad
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A Leaner, Meaner Jihad
By SCOTT ATRAN
Published: March 16, 2004
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United States Armament 
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NN ARBOR, Mich.
The coordinated train bombings in Madrid have altered Europe's political structure, shaken 
global financial markets and unsettled the American-led coalition in Iraq. Although we still do 
not know for sure who committed the atrocity, the only groups to have claimed responsibility so 
far say they represent Al Qaeda. 
In any event, the attacks are clearly consistent with jihadist doctrine and aims. Osama bin Laden, 
specifically mentioning the loss of southern Spain to Christianity in 1492, has made it clear that 
any land once in Muslim hands was fair game for global jihad. 
For the last year the Israeli historian Reuven Paz has monitored jihadist writings about Spain, 
which focused on the Spanish government's participation in Iraq. "In order to force the Spanish 
government to withdraw from Iraq," one online tract read, "it is a must to exploit the coming 
general elections in Spain." It added that two to three attacks would ensure "the victory of the 
Socialist Party and the withdrawal of Spanish forces," the first domino in the collapse of the 
American-led coalition.
No matter who is responsible for the Madrid attacks, they remind us that America faces a task 
reminiscent of Hercules' fight against the Hydra, the monster who sprouted new heads for each 
one severed. From the bombings in Morocco, Indonesia and Turkey last year, to the more recent 
suicide attacks in Iraq and Pakistan on the Shiite holy day of Ashura, it is clear that since 9/11 we 
have misunderstood the nature of global jihad. 
While most Westerners have imagined a tightly coordinated transnational terrorist network headed by Al Qaeda, it seems more likely 
we face a set of largely autonomous groups and cells pursuing their own regional aims. Yes, some groups — from Ansar al-Islam in 
Iraq to Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia to Pakistan's Jaish-e-Muhammed — seem to be coordinating strategy and perhaps tactical 
operations among themselves. But for the most part the factions are swarming on their own initiative — homing in from scattered 
locations on various targets and then dispersing, only to form new swarms. 
While these groups share the motivations and methods of Al Qaeda, it is likely they have had only distant relations with Osama bin 
Laden and the Sunni salafists around him. In fact, Mr. bin Laden and the Qaeda hardcore should perhaps be viewed as they were in 
the 1990's, as just one hub of a loosely knit global network of mujahedeen leaders left over from the Soviet-Afghan war. It was only 
after the F.B.I. began investigating the 1998 American Embassy bombings in Africa that American prosecutors — and the rest of the 
world — began referring to Al Qaeda as a global terrorist organization. We may be overestimating Mr. bin Laden's reach.
The suicide bombings last November in Istanbul are a case in point. Turkish officials immediately attributed the bombings to Al 
Qaeda, although it quickly became clear that the explosives were probably made and detonated by Turkish groups claiming to 
represent Al Qaeda's aims. In fact, Osama bin Laden's greatest threat may be that simply by claiming to act in his name, regional 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/16/opinion/16ATRA.html?ex=1394773200&en=a42ef (1 of 2) [03/16/2004 1:02:52 PM]Op-Ed Contributor: A Leaner, Meaner Jihad
groups are better able to recruit and coordinate operations.
United States special forces have recently stepped up their pursuit of Mr. bin Laden in the no man's land between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. While it would of course be a triumph to capture or kill him, his demise is unlikely to prove decisive. The war in Iraq 
has energized so many disparate groups that global terrorism is better prepared than ever to carry on without Mr. bin Laden. Even 
with many top Qaeda leaders now dead or in custody, the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London is reporting that 
global recruitment for anti-American jihad is rising and that many small, decentralized groups have sprung up that are harder for 
governments to identify and neutralize than was the case before the invasion.
Last year, there were 98 suicide attacks around the world, more than any year in contemporary history. Suicide terrorism plagues 
Iraq for the first time since the 13th-century assassins. A distinct pattern in this litany of atrocities has been pointed out by Robert 
Axelrod, a political scientist at the University of Michigan. Charting terrorist attacks by organization and lethality, he has noted an 
increasing interest in well-planned attacks intended to produce high numbers of civilian casualties — a pattern into which the Madrid 
bombings, on commuter train stations at the morning rush, fit neatly. This trend also seems to point to an eventual suicide attack 
using chemical or nuclear weapons. 
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 A Leaner, Meaner Jihad 
Published: March 16, 2004
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(Page 2 of 2)
So what can we do? Traditional top-heavy approaches — strategic bombardment, invasion and 
other large-scale forms of coercion — will not be any use against border-hopping jihadist 
swarms, and they would only add to their popular support. 
Surprisingly, however, pinpoint responses may not be the answer either. Kathleen Carley, a 
professor at Carnegie Mellon University, has used intelligence data and computer modeling to 
monitor changes in jihadist networks, including the cell responsible for the suicide bombing of 
the American Embassy in Tanzania. She found that eliminating the "central actors" — that is, cell 
members who have the most ties to other cell members and to other groups — has actually 
spurred terrorists to adapt more quickly, and has been less effective in the long run than 
eliminating less-central foot soldiers. Thus assassinations of leaders (a favorite Israeli tactic) may 
be counterproductive, in addition to causing public revulsion.
Rather, destroying terrorist networks requires what David Ronfeldt, a RAND analyst, calls 
"netwar." This is, in effect, mimicking the swarming tactics of the enemy. It involves long 
missions by smallish, mobile military units that can quickly descend on terrorist groups. 
This approach also requires a sort of global spider web — a set of international and interfaith 
alliances bonded by mutual trust and purpose. Such a true coalition of the willing would have the 
collective intelligence and resourcefulness needed to stop the swarms. While Spain's incoming 
prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, intends to pull Spanish troops out of Iraq, he has 
said he would back efforts in Iraq and elsewhere as part of a United Nations enterprise. So would much of the world. Just as 
Hercules needed the help of his nephew Iolaus to kill the Hydra, the United States will not conquer the Islamic terror without the 
popular support of its allies. The jihadists are betting America will try to go it alone.
Scott Atran, a research scientist at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris and the University of Michigan, is author of 
"In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion."
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http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/16/opinion/16ATRA.html?pagewanted=2&en=a42ef&ex=1394773200 (1 of 2) [03/16/2004 1:02:59 PM]Op-Ed Contributor: A Leaner, Meaner Jihad
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Al Qaeda's Web: The Upgraded Networks of Global Terrorism

http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/35/44/PDF/ijn_00000482_00.pdf

Al Qaeda's Web: The Upgraded Networks of Global Terrorism

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