Earnout-Ansatz in M&A-Transaktionen : Überbrückung von unterschiedlichen Preisvorstellungen in der Unternehmensnachfolge von KMU

Abstract

Succession planning by means of M&A transactions fails quite often when SMEs are involved, the reason being that the parties cannot agree on a transaction price due to asymmetric information. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether earnout approaches are a suitable means to reduce asymmetric information and agency costs and thereby increase the probability of a successful M&A transaction. A specially developed catalogue of criteria is applied to a sample of 27 M&A-transactions focusing on SMEs with earnout components (case studies). The results allow the conclusion that earnout approaches are, together with other measures, for a certain group of enterprises, an appropriate instrument to reduce information asymmetries. The application of the criteria catalogue shows – in varying degrees and intensity – that earnout components generally seem to reduce information asymmetries. However, the effect on agency costs remains unclear.Nachfolgeregelungen von KMU mittels M&A-Transaktionen, welche ausserhalb der Familie erfolgen, scheitern häufig. Der Grund liegt oftmals darin, dass sich die Parteien aufgrund asymmetrischer Informationen nicht auf einen Transaktionspreis einigen können. Die Arbeit untersucht, ob Earnout-Ansätze geeignet sind, asymmetrische Informationen und Agency-Kosten zu vermindern und dadurch die Wahrscheinlichkeit zu erhöhen, dass eine M&A-Transaktion erfolgreich realisiert wird. Ein eigens entwickelter Kriterienkatalog wird an einer Stichprobe von 27 M&A-Transaktionen von KMU mit Earnout-Komponenten angewendet. Die Resultate dieser Case Studies zeigen, dass der Earnout, gemeinsam mit weiteren Massnahmen, für eine gewisse Gruppe von Unternehmen ein geeignetes Instrument zur Verminderung von Informationsasymmetrien darstellt. Die Wirkung auf die Agency-Kosten bleibt allerdings unklar.Succession planning by means of M&A transactions fails quite often when SMEs are involved, the reason being that the parties cannot agree on a transaction price due to asymmetric information. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether earnout approaches are a suitable means to reduce asymmetric information and agency costs and thereby increase the probability of a successful M&A transaction. A specially developed catalogue of criteria is applied to a sample of 27 M&A-transactions focusing on SMEs with earnout components (case studies). The results allow the conclusion that earnout approaches are, together with other measures, for a certain group of enterprises, an appropriate instrument to reduce information asymmetries. The application of the criteria catalogue shows – in varying degrees and intensity – that earnout components generally seem to reduce information asymmetries. However, the effect on agency costs remains unclear