Who Lobbies and When: Analyzing Patterns of Foreign Lobbying

Abstract

My dissertation ``Who Lobbies and When: Analyzing Patterns of Foreign Lobbying Activities" studies (a) who lobbies, (b) for what purposes, and (c) when. Foreign lobbying involves a wide set of actions that foreign governments, firms, interest groups, and individuals take to pursue their interests and interact with diverse actors in other states. Like diplomacy, foreign lobbying aims to facilitate interstate interaction and help actors achieve their international goals. Yet, since not only governments but also firms and interest groups can engage in lobbying and choose lobbying topics and tactics, I suggest foreign lobbying as a more versatile, alternative form of diplomacy. The United States, as the global superpower, has experienced nearly 53,000 lobbying incidents conducted by foreign actors from about 250 countries since 1971. However, despite the prevalence and persistence of foreign lobbying activities, we have scant knowledge about the basics of foreign lobbying. The lack of theoretical and empirical understanding of foreign lobbying activities motivated my dissertation. What is foreign lobbying? What are the patterns of foreign lobbying activities? The dissertation provides systematic information on foreign lobbying activities and examines the conditions that affect lobbying patterns. Chapter 1 discusses the dissertation's research questions, findings, and contributions. Chapter 2 introduces my original Foreign Lobbying Dataset (FOLD), which records the number of lobbying activities between 1971-2017 classified by principal type, topic, and tactic at the country-year level. Chapters 3 and 4 examine how international institutions influence foreign actors' incentives for lobbying. By showing the positive and significant association between a country's lobbying activities and its linkages with the United States through international institutions, Chapter 3 finds that foreign actors resort to lobbying as a complement to facilitate institutions' objectives. Chapter 4 examines the relationship between Free Trade Agreement negotiation process and the timing of foreign lobbying activities.  The significant increase in foreign lobbying activities, particularly by foreign governments, from two years before FTA signing and until entry into force implies that actors utilize lobbying to influence the design and implementation of FTAs. Both empirical chapters highlight the value of foreign lobbying as a complementary diplomatic instrument compatible with formal international institutions

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