In this paper, I respond to the case against deontological moral theory that Joshua Greene develops in \u22The Secret Joke of Kant\u27s Soul\u22 and elsewhere. Using empirical data he and colleagues collected on peoples\u27 judgments in various moral dilemmas, Greene attempts to show that deontology rests on unsound foundations. In brief, he contends that the intuitions used to support deontological theory are undermined because they are responses to a morally irrelevant feature he calls \u22personalness.\u22 I argue that deontologists can respond to Greene\u27s arguments by drawing a distinction between \u22practical\u22 and \u22theoretical\u22 intuitions. I contend that it is only the former sort of intuitions that are undermined by Greene\u27s evidence, and that deontological theory can be supported purely on the basis of theoretical intuitions
