Consolidation of Cooperative Banks (Shinkin) in Japan:Motives and Consequences

Abstract

We investigate the motives and consequences of the consolidation of cooperative banks (Shinkin) in Japan during the period 1984-2002. Our major findings are as follows. First, less profitable and less cost efficient banks are more likely to be an acquirer and a target, though even less profitable and less cost efficient banks are more likely to be a target rather than an acquirer. In addition, a larger bank is more likely to be an acquirer and smaller one a target. These results are consistent with the regulators' motive for stabilizing the local banking system.¡¡Second, acquiring banks improved cost efficiency after the consolidation. M&As also raised the loan interest rate and improved profitability and X-efficiency particularly since the latter half of the 1990s. Nonetheless, the improvement of ROA after the merger was not sufficient to fill in the initial gap of the capital ratio between merging banks and peers, resulting in the deterioration of the capital ratio of consolidated banks relative to peers. M&As did not contribute to sufficiently stabilize the local banking system despite the regulators' motive. Third, the consolidation tended to improve the profitability of merging banks when the difference in profitability and healthiness between acquiring banks and target banks were large, which is consistent with the relative efficiency hypothesis (e.g., Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey, 1997).Length: 48 pages