Deregulation of conveyancing markets in England and Wales

Abstract

There has been much concern in recent years with whether the ‘privilege’ of self- regulation accorded to the professions works for or against the public interest (Federal Trade Commission, 1984; Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1970, 1976a and 1976b; Department of Trade and Industry, 1989; Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990). Ogus (1993) argues that ‘Self-regulation has had a bad press’ and that ‘most of this criticism is well-founded in relation to some forms of self- regulation’. Economists have been, traditionally, highly critical of many aspects of professional self-regulation.2 More recently, there has been a greater awareness of the informational asymmetry inherent in professional markets which demands some protection for the (infrequent) consumer of personal professional services (see, for example, Dingwall and Fenn (1987)). Commentators have identified three principal instruments of such selfregulators which work against the public interest: (1) restrictions on entry; (2) restrictions on fee competition; and (3) restrictions on advertising and other means of promoting a competitive process within the profession.