This thesis explores how the concept of “legal corruption” manifests itself within the
European Investment Bank with a modern approach to the theoretical understanding of anticorruption
efforts. This approach conceptualises the idea of complementing theories based on
contextual applicability rather than focusing on their competing qualities. The European
Investment Bank (EIB), as the world’s largest multilateral lender, is an underexplored yet
vital organ of the European Union, which has recently faced criticism for its alleged lack of
transparency and dubious application of policy. This thesis’s approach is to operationalise
legal corruption and transparency around earlier research and theories, compared with
governing documents, resolved cases from the European Ombudsman, the European
Parliament, as well as a recently leaked internal report on whistleblowing. In doing so, it has
managed to exhibit discrepancies between policy and practice based on four categories for
efficient and sustainable policies: culture, power, responsiveness, and trust. This thesis
concludes that, although formally correct policies are in place, informal institutions and the
need for empowered independent auditors play a crucial role in policy compliance
