TURFs and ITQs: Collective vs. Individual Decision Making

Abstract

While most of the attention in the scientific and policy literature on rights-based institutions has been devoted to Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), there are alternatives that involve different configurations of use rights. One such alternative is a space-based option commonly referred to as Territorial Use Rights Fisheries (TURFs). TURFs have been utilized in island fisheries off Southeast Asia for decades, and they have been well studied, particularly by anthropologists and sociologists. This paper discusses case studies of TURF organizations in Japan and Chile from an economics perspective. We discuss the historical origins of each system, outline the legal and institutional structures of the systems, and then discuss how each system manages nearshore coastal resources. We discuss similarities and differences across the many specific collective management structures adopted by Japanese and Chilean TURF organizations. We then discuss how outcomes differ from what might emerge under ITQs.Collective management, resource management, rights-based fishery management, TURFs, Environmental Economics and Policy, International Relations/Trade, Q22,