Environmental Economics and Policy, Production Economics,

Seijo, Juan Carlos

English

Research Papers in Economics

Marine Resource Economics, Volume 8, pp. 78-81 0738-1360/93 $3.00 + .00
Printed in the USA. All rights reserved. Copyright © 1993 Marine Resources Foundation
Thalassorama
Individual Transferable Grounds in a Community Managed
Artisanal Fishery
Introduction
Current schemes to manage high exclusion-cost resources often contemplate two
basic approaches: (i) privatization of the resource {e.g., allocation of individual
transferable quotas), and (ii) government intervention through regulation of size
and composition of the catch using a variety of policy instruments affecting fishing
effort (Pearse, 1980; Anderson, 1986, 1992). A third approach in the literature is
the community-based management of marine resources (Smith and Berkes, 1991;
McCay and Acheson, 1987). Berkes (1989) argues that traditional community-
based systems are underestimated in their potential role in resource management.
For some fisheries, however, combinations of these three approaches may prove
most effective for management. To explore this proposition, I apply the context-
structure-performance paradigm of the neoinstitutional school of economics
(Schmid, 1987; Wilson and Lent, 1992) to explain the behaviour of the collec-
tively-managed spiny lobster fishery of Punta Allen, Mexico. The human inter-
dependencies that exist in the use of a high exclusion-cost good like lobsters,
together with the presence of high transactions costs (contractual, information
and enforcement costs), seem to have motivated this coastal community to adopt
institutions such as collective voluntary organizations and informal privatization
of fishing grounds to sustain resource rent over time.
Context
In 1969 a group of 49 fisherfolk from a nearby community called Vigia Chico,
formed a cooperative and settled in an isolated site establishing a new fishing
village in Punta Allen in the southeastern part of the Yucatan Peninsula. The
purpose of this settlement was to facilitate their harvesting operations of spiny
lobster and reef fish species, and to have access to fresh water (Salasar, 1981).
Three aspects characterize this fishing community: (i) lobster fishing is the only
significant economic activity, (ii) the relatively small continental shelf forces fish-
ermen to harvest mostly juveniles and young adults in the back reef and inner
Ascension Bay area, (iii) a high degree of isolation from the rest of the world has
motivated a self-help approach to community development (Seijo and Fuentes,
1989).
One of the main features of the lobster (Panulirus argus) fishery in this area is
the use of artificial habitats, or "sombras", to facilitate and increase harvesting
rates. It should be pointed out that these man-made shelters may enhance recruit-
ment by mitigating predation mortality by other species besides humans. By 1988
there were 14,210 artificial habitats and 55 small-scale boats (25 feet length with
outboard motors and an average of two fishermen per boat). One of the main
78Community Managed Fishery 79
characteristics distinguishing this lobster fishery from others in the area is the
informal allocation of property rights that cooperative members have achieved by
dividing up in 150 lots the lobster fishing grounds. These fishing lots have an area
ranging from 0.5 to 3 km^ and are located in both inner-bay (Ascension Bay) and
back-coral reef areas within a depth interval of one to four fathoms (Miller, 1982).
Since the beginning of the fishery, the fishing grounds (of varying sizes) have
progressively been allocated over time to fishermen as they have entered the
cooperative. The number of members has stabilized since 1986. Before everyliew
fishing season starts, bargaining for grounds and existing artificial habitats (rent-
ing and exchange) takes place among cooperative members.
Structure
The spiny lobster fishery of Punta Allen, Mexico moved from an open access {res
nullius) to a common property resource {res communes) in 1947 when the State
granted to fishermen organized in cooperatives the exclusive property rights to
harvest a number of high valued species, including lobsters. Regarding resource
use and conservation, there are two fishery regulations: a four-month closed
season, and a legal minimum size restriction. Internally, the cooperative has
implemented a number of rules and enforcement mechanisms.
The temporary (renting) or permanent (selling) transfer of individual rights to
fishing grounds involves very simple artisanal transactions. If a fishing ground
rentEil agreement takes place, a fisherman agrees to periodically pay the fishing
ground "owner" a specific amount in accordance to ground size, number of
artificial habitats lying within it, and its perceived relative productivity in previous
years. Permanent transfer of fishing grounds among cooperative members may
involve monetary payments and/or barter transactions.
The cooperative's internal rules are rigid and designed for both individual and
collective behaviour that seem to assure healthy and stable community develop-
ment. Some of these rules include applying a variety of penalties for unacceptable
behaviour, and others involve the immediate exclusion of a cooperative member.
For instance, a member found harvesting lobsters in someone else's ground, or
violating the lobster closed season, loses his cooperative membership. This is
equivalent to the loss of community respect and may be a motive for leaving Punta
Allen (Canto et al, 1988). Interviews and observations suggest that effective
application of the rules is the result of good leadership nourished by a highly
democratic process within the cooperative. Information costs have been mitigated
during the last 10 years because fishermen have participated in, and directly
benefited from, research efforts {e.g. the geographic specification of grounds
provided by Miller (1982)).
Performance
The market mechanism {i.e., implicit privatization of a common property re-
source) within a voluntary collective organization seems to have led to a sustain-
able resource allocation in the community. Contrary \o other lobster fisheries of
the Yucatdn, where free rider behavior is very common {e.g., the trap fishery of
Isla Mujeres), the presence of non-contributing fishermen is reported as very
limited in Punta Allen (Seijo and Fuentes, 1989). Olson's (1965) and Ostrom's80 Thalassorama
(1990) hypothesis of the dynamics of group size seem to be consistent with what
is observed in this small-scale fishery. The relatively small size of the group (107
fishermen) harvesting this renewable resource, together with strong community
rules and self-policing strategies, may cause the relatively low level of free-rider
behaviour. Because of the degree of isolation of this community, and high oppor-
tunity cost of State enforcement (Sutinen, 1987; Anderson, 1989) in the area,
external enforcement is basically absent. Therefore, whatever is achieved in
terms of current regulations is the result of community voluntary behaviour. The
rules concerning allocation of fishing grounds and artificial habitat ownership are
essentially respected by the fishermen involved. According to community leaders
Pereyra, Cime and Salasar (pers. comm.), the rules have contributed substantially
to discouraging non-contributing behaviour (free riders) among cooperative mem-
bers and protecting the resource, and have enhanced the benefits of voluntary
collective action in the community on a number of other resource related issues.
Concerning Government regulations, the closed season is basically respected,
but the minimum size restriction is not. Length frequency analysis during the
1987-1988 season of lobster tails harvested by the four fishing methods used in the
Yucatan showed that the artificial habitats used at Punta Allen involved the high-
est incidence of juveniles and young adults (Seijo et al., 1991). This seems to be
the result of the spatial allocation of effort. Artificial habitats have been intro-
duced in the shallow waters of Ascension Bay close to the postlarvae settlement
area. Even though fishermen, when harvesting, can discriminate against smaller
than authorized sizes, two factors motivate them not to do so. First, there is a
market for lobsters smaller than the minimum size restriction, and second, fish-
ermen have a general understanding of the life cycle of Panulirus argus. They are
aware that because of long larval stages, the resource is at the mercy of currents
from 6 to 9 months. Therefore, it is believed that postlarvae settling in the area in
subsequent periods will be not only the result of how many juveniles were pro-
tected by Punta Allen fishermen to become spawners, but also how juveniles and
adults in other areas of the Caribbean basin are being exploited.
Even though fishermen from Punta Allen are able to avoid, at least at com-
munity-ecosystem level, the fisheries socid trap of inconsistent micromotives
with desired macroresults (Schelling, 1978), in the long run, they may become
unwitting free riders by not knowing the overall shared stock effect of their fishing
effort, and therefore unwillingly contribute to the destruction of this resource. The
transboundary nature of the spiny lobster population introduces other types of
human interdependencies which may require complex bioeconomic analysis and
international cooperation to avoid dissipation of economic rent.
Juan Carlos Seijo
Departamento de Recursos del Mar
CINVESTAV-Unidad M6rida
Apartado Postal 73 "Cordemex"
Mdrida, Yucatan, Mexico.
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Common property resources: ecology and community-based sustainable development.

Comparative bioeconomic analysis of the spiny lobster {Panulirus argus) small scale fishery of the Yucatan shelf.

Construction of shallow water habitats to increase lobster production in Mexico.

Enforcement of the MFCMA: An economist perspective.

Fundamental issues in the design of ITQ programs.

Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action.

Property power and public choice: an inquiry into law and economics. Second edition.

Reglamento interno de la sociedad cooperativa de produccidn pesquera &quot;Pescadores de Vigia Chico&quot;,

Regulation of fishing effort.

Relato de lafundacidn de la Sociedad Cooperativa y de la comunidad Colonia Javier Rojo Gdmez.

Solutions to the &quot;tragedy of the commons&quot;: sea-urchin management in St. Lucia, West Indies.

The economics of fisheries management. Revised and enlarged edition. The Johns Hopkins

The logic of collective action.

The new institutional economics applied to fisheries: the role of information in the (continuing) solution of resource problems.

The spiny lobster {Panulirus argus) fishery of Punta Allen,

Individual Transferable Grounds in a Community Managed Artisanal Fishery

Individual Transferable Grounds in a Community Managed Artisanal Fishery

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