Croatian Defence Academy (CDA) “Dr. Franjo Tuđman”
Abstract
Nakon proglašenja hrvatske neovisnosti u lipnju 1991. godine, vojni vrh Jugoslavenske
narodne armije (JNA) uz potporu srbijanskog političkog vodstva u jesen 1991.
pokrenuo je napadnu vojnu operaciju kojoj je cilj bio razbiti i pokoriti Hrvatsku.
Strateški plan Kadijevićeva vojnog vrha JNA za slamanje Hrvatske u petnaest dana
doživio je krah i može se svrstati u najgore vojne promašaje u drugoj polovici 20.
stoljeća.
Na samim početcima Domovinskog rata dva događaja bila su presudna za obranu
Hrvatske u rujnu 1991. Prvi presudni utjecaj na opstanak Hrvatske u rujnu 1991.
imalo je zauzimanje vojnih skladišta opreme s teškim naoružanjem 32. korpusa JNA
(varaždinskog). Drugi presudni utjecaj na tijek vojne operacije imao je raspad 1.
pgmd JNA, poznatije kao Titova divizija na posavskom koridoru.
U uvodnom dijelu rada objašnjavaju se razmjeri oružane pobune u zapadnoj Slavoniji
i uloga koju je ona imala u planu vojnog vrha JNA za slamanje Hrvatske. U drugome
dijelu rada pojašnjena je glavna ideja Kadijevićeva strateškog plana s ključnim
smjerovima napada na Hrvatsku. Rad se fokusira na odluku zapovjednika 1. vojne
oblasti JNA o napadu na Slavoniju i kolaps glavne snage JNA na posavskom koridoru
kod Tovarnika i Ilače.After the declaration of Croatian independence in June 1991, the military leadership
of the Yugoslav People’s Army (INA) with the support of the Serbian political
leadership launched an offensive military operation in the fall of 1991 with the aim of
defeating and subjugating Croatia. The Offensive strategic plan of Kadijević’s JNA
military leadership to crush Croatia in fifteen days, experienced a collapse, and can be
classified as one of the worst military failures of the second half of the 20th century.
At the very beginning of the Homeland War, two events were decisive for the defense
of Croatia in September 1991. The first decisive influence on the survival of Croatia
in September 1991 was -occupation of military equipment and heavy weapon depot
of the JNA 32nd-Corps (Varaždin). The second crucial influence on the course of
military operations is the disintegration of 1. JNA guard division, better known as
Tito’s division, on the Posavina corridor.
The introductory part of the paper explains the extent of the armed rebellion in
Western Slavonia and the role it played in the plan of the JNA military leadership
to crush Croatia. The second part of the paper clarifies the main idea of Kadijević’s
strategic plan with the key directions of the attack on Croatia. The paper focuses on
the decision of the commander of the 1st JNA military district to attack Slavonia as
well as on the collapse of JNA main force on the Posavina corridor near Tovarnik and
Ilača
