Software Piracy in Egypt: Analysis of the Institutional Environment and Efficiency of Enforcement Measures

Abstract

This paper develops the first applied econometric model to examine the efficiency of existing enforcement measures and legal framework on prevailing software piracy rates in Egypt. Hence, it can be used as a tool when discussing new policies concerning the welfare of the interest groups and the pricing of protected software products (i.e., original software products). The model will focus on the available time-series data during 1992-2002 in Egypt. This time period was chosen due to the paucity of quantitative data concerning the model. The institutional environment is examined according to the New Institutional Economics (NIE) to illustrate the legal framework, the informal constraints and the enforcement authorities to support the empirical model. Analytical results show that efficient enforcement of property rights does not only imply increasing legal enforcement through imposing more severe punishments and prosecutions, as decreasing the prices of software plays a much bigger role. Thus relying on legal enforcement authorities alone is not always economically optimal, as it will not be able to deter IPR infringement on its own.Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), Legal Enforcement, New Institutional Economics (NIE), Software Piracy, Egypt