Dublin System, Right to Family Reunification and the Relevance of European Court of Human Rights’ Standards

Abstract

U radu se analiziraju pravni režimi koji se u pravu Evropske unije primenjuju na spajanje porodice izbeglica i drugih osoba kojima je potrebna međunarodna zaštita. Najpre su analizirane odredbe Direktive 2003/86/EZ o pravu na spajanje porodice državljana trećih zemalja, koja u posebnoj glavi predviđa pravila o spajanju porodice lica kojima je priznat izbeglički status. Međutim, kako je Direktivom izričito predviđeno da njenim odredbama nisu obuhvaćene osobe koje uživaju druge oblike međunarodne zaštite niti tražioci azila, rešenje za te kategorije lica potraženo je u aktima Zajedničkog evropskog sistema azila, pre svega u Uredbi Dablin. Analiza je pokazala da Uredba Dablin raspolaže rešenjima samo u odnosu na dve situacije u kojima se može postaviti pitanje spajanja ili pak sprečavanja razdvajanja porodice. Jedinstvo porodice se javlja kao primarni kriterijum za određivanje države odgovorne za ispitivanje zahteva za azil, ali je od značaja i za donošenje odluke o vraćanju lica na teritoriju države članice koja se smatra odgovornom za ispitivanje zahteva za azil, to jest u kontekstu takozvanog Dablin transfera. Ipak, domašaj tih rešenja se ukazuje kao krajnje ograničen, i to ne samo zbog uskog pojma porodice koji ne odgovara pojmu porodice koji upotrebljava Evropski sud za ljudska prava, već i zbog toga što su rešenja ograničena na članove porodice koji se već nalaze na teritoriji države članice. Iz toga proizlazi da u pravu EU postoji pravna praznina kada su u pitanju situacije u kojima osoba koja je dobila supsidijarnu ili humanitarnu zaštitu čini napore da na teritoriju države članice EU dovede člana svoje porodice, kao i kada je reč o razdvajanju porodice tih kategorija lica zbog izvršenja odluke o prinudnom vraćanju u zemlju porekla. Rešenje se, međutim, može naći u sve bogatijoj praksi Evropskog suda za ljudska prava, u kojoj je povreda prava na poštovanje porodičnog života razmatrana upravo u kontekstu tih kategorija lica.The paper analyzes different EU legal regimes that are applied to family reunification of refugees and other persons in need of international protection. The analysis starts by focusing on the provisions of Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification of third country nationals which, in a separate chapter, envisages rules on the family reunification of persons with recognized refugee status. However, as the Directive explicitly provides that its provisions apply neither to persons who enjoy other forms of international protection nor to asylum seekers, solutions for these categories of persons are searched for in the legal acts that comprise the Common European Asylum System, Dublin Regulation in particular. The analysis has shown that the Dublin Regulation disposes of solutions only in relation to two situations in which the issue of family reunification or separation can be raised. Family unity appears as the primary criterion for determining the state responsible for examining the asylum application, but it is also relevant in the context of decisions to return the person to the territory of the Member State considered as responsible for the application, i.e. within the so called Dublin transfers. Nevertheless, the scope of the above-mentioned solutions appears to be limited, not only because of the rather narrow concept of a family that does not correspond to the concept used by the European Court of Human Rights, but also because the solutions are limited to family members already present in the territory of a Member State. It may be concluded that there is a legal vacuum in EU law when it comes to situations in which a person who has been recognized subsidiary or humanitarian protection makes efforts to bring a member of his family to the territory of a Member State, as well as regards separation of family of the said categories of persons for the purpose of executing a decision on forced return to the country of origin. The solution may, however, be found in the increasingly rich practice of the European Court of Human Rights in which the violation of the right to respect for family life was considered in the context of the said categories of persons