In this thesis, I analyse language ideologies discernible in professional discourse
of Polish scholars of language generated during three recent periods of Polish history:
the last two decades of ‘communist authoritarianism’ (1970–1989), liberal democracy
building (1989–2015), and the crisis of democracy under the rule of the right-wing
populist Law and Justice party (2015–2023). I ask: What language ideologies are
detectable in professional metalinguistic discourse developed by Polish scholars of
language in these three periods? Are these language ideologies related to any political
ideology, and if so, how? Why are certain language ideologies more salient than
others in professional metalinguistic discourse in these three periods?
I argue that Polish scholars of language supported or challenged specific visions
of socio-political order, even if inadvertently, by relying on language ideologies in their
professional discourse. They explicitly discuss language, but implicitly make
normative statements about the socio-political system that language represents.
Because the construction of the socio-political world is always carried out within a
specific language, discourse about language references two layers of reality: on the
one hand, it refers to language, but on the other, to the socio-political world it
constructs. I demonstrate that language ideologies are related to political ideologies,
and this relationship is more evident in discourses produced under non-democratic
or anti-democratic regimes. The Polish case suggests, I further argue, that regime
changes are an important factor impacting the changes in professional metalinguistic
discourse.
In my analysis of linguistic studies of communist propaganda written during the
period of communist authoritarianism, I show that the underlying axiology of these
studies is liberal. Consequently, liberal language ideology, founded on such axiology,
challenges the legitimising principles of the communist regime. I also analyse a
newspaper column authored by a professional linguist in state media, which employs
standard language ideology. I argue that although the communist authorities may
have hoped the column would legitimise their construction of Polish national identity,
it promoted its alternative (nationalist-conservative) version.
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Next, I analyse Polish professional metalinguistic discourse produced during the
period of liberal democracy building. I show that they promoted the idea of
‘protecting Polish’, which led to the appointment of the Polish Language Council in
1996 and to the passing of the Polish Language Act in 1999. I argue that compared to
the previous period, Polish scholars of language employed a much more elaborate
and comprehensive version of standard language ideology ‘thickened’ by nationalist
and purist language ideologies, which were aimed at constructing a specific version
of national identity (homogeneous, guided by the elites, with a strong state) in the
period of economic, political, social, and cultural transformations.
Turning to the period of democratic backsliding, I analyse two Polish Language
Council reports on the state of the Polish language published in this period, arguing
that professional metalinguistic discourse at the time underwent a liberal turn and is
indicative of the ongoing culture war. On the one hand, Polish scholars of language
again employed liberal language ideology (which was much more robust than in the
period of communist authoritarianism) to explicitly defend democracy. On the other
hand, Polish scholars of language continued promoting standard, nationalist, and
purist language ideologies dominant in the previous period. While these linguists
explicitly criticised the government, their professional discourse may have continued
creating a discursive opportunity structure for the right-wing populist discourse of the
Law and Justice party
