In my presentation, I will attempt to show how a phenomenologically consequent interpretation of narrative identity would lead to eco-ethical and eco-political consequences. In particular, I will try to show the outlines of an eco-socialist theory, which implies an egalitarian approach of all living beings, and which is motivated by a phenomenological understanding of narrative identity.
My presentation consists of two main parts. In the first part, I would like to treat the relationship between freedom, responsibility and – narratively conceived – personal identity, from a phenomenological point of view. The main authors of this part will be Husserl, Heidegger, Ricoeur, Lévinas and László Tengelyi. For Husserl, the narrative aspect of personal identity was already an important topic. For Heidegger, our own decisions constitute our identity. But in my opinion, there is a decisive factor, which was marginal for Heidegger, in regard of our identity and freedom: the Other. The Other’s problem became central for Lévinas, and also for Ricoeur. László Tengelyi modified Ricoeur’s account of narrative identity on a decisive point: he draws the attention to the role of “events of fate”; events that change the course of our lives fundamentally.
In the second part I would like to show the ethical and political implications of the first part. The way in which we treat in fact the Other shows the best, who we are in real. But the Other must not just be a human being; she or he can be a living being whatsoever. Here I would like to emphasize the eco-phenomenological motifs in Husserl (to this see also: Erazim Kohák); and I will try to show how such motifs lead to an egalitarian, eco-socialist view of everything which lives
