Why could political incentives be different during election times? This article provides answers to this question using a career-concern model of political cycles. The analysis in the article is also relevant to understanding other agency relationships in which an important part of compensation is decided on infrequently.Business cycles

Leonardo Martinez

English

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Why could political incentives be different during election times?

http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_quarterly/2009/summer/pdf/martinez.pdf

Why could political incentives be different during election times?

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Research Papers in Economics