A presentation of a model predicting that debt or similar claims will dominate the portfolios of institutions that specialize in providing monitored finance. Among these institutions, those with greater liquidity needs should hold fewer monitored equity positions, make less risky loans, and monitor less intensively.Financial institutions ; Liquidity (Economics)

Andrew Winton

English

Research Papers in Economics

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and Anjan Thakor

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Monitored finance, liquidity, and institutional investment choice

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