While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the indices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour.Economics (Jel: A)

Kóczy, László Á.

English

Research Papers in Economics

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Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions

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Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions

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Research Papers in Economics