Based on empirical methodology, this study is an attempt at providing a quality level assessment of the Hungarian judicature. Since the 1990 regime change two major justice reforms have taken place aimed at improving the quality and efficiency of justice. The reform of 1997 dramatically transforming the judicial hierarchy system, court management and the procedural framework was carried out under the auspices of EU accession and attempted to improve the quality of justice following explicitly European examples. In this spirit, a central administrative body was established (the National Judicial Council), which played a crucial role in the matter of improving the quality of justice. The Orbán Government that came to power in 2010 carried out a reform as an EU Member State that triggered harsh criticism from international organizations as well as EU institutions. With prioritizing quality and efficiency aspects, the elements of the reform that brought about objections from those having cause for concern about judicial independence were justified by the legislator. The question remains which objective was the real one and what role courts play in the Hungarian political system that has evolved since 2010. In order to find the answer, what is needed is to examine how sound the government's allusion is regarding the interest in the improvement of quality and efficiency and in what political context the second judicial reform took place. Measuring quality and efficiency and making comparisons to other countries is a weighty endeavor, which can be traced back to differences in the justice systems of certain legal systems. In spite of methodological difficulties, establishing a diagnosis about the condition of the Hungarian judicature will be attempted, which presents an opportunity to compare it to the state of the judicature of other EU countries
