Trade Credit, Collateral Liquidation and Borrowing Constraints

Abstract

The paper proposes a model of collateralized bank and trade credit. Firms use a two-input technology. Assuming that the supplier is better able to extract value from existing assets and has an information advantage over other creditors, the paper derives a series of predictions. (1) Financially unconstrained firms (with unused bank credit lines) take trade credit for a liquidation motive. (2) The reliance on trade credit does not depend on credit rationing, if inputs are liquid enough. (3) Firms buying goods make more purchases on account than those buying services, while suppliers of services offer more trade credit than those of standardized goods. (4) Suppliers lend inputs to their customers but not cash. (5) Greater reliance on trade credit is associated with more intensive use of tangible inputs. (6) Better creditor protection decreases both the use of trade credit and input tangibility.trade credit, collateral, financial constraints, asset tangibility, creditor protection ibility