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Strategic Information Acquisition in Networked Groups with "Informational Spillovers"
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Abstract
This paper develops a model of costly information acquisition by agents who are
connected through a network. For a exogenously given network, each agent decides first on information acquisition from his neighbors and then, after processing the information acquired, takes an action. Each agent is concerned about the extent to
which other agents align their actions with the underlying state. A new equilibrium
notion, which is in the spirit of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, is proposed to analyze
information acquisition decisions within networked groups. This equilibrium notion
allows each agent to compute, when deciding about information acquisition, the extent
to which changes in his information acquisition decision will affect his own perception
of future expected payos. Agents anticipate and incorporate such changes in their
information acquisition decisions. Both the efficient and the equilibrium information
acquisition proles are characterized and the compatibility between them is related to
the density of the network.Incomplete Information, Information Acquisition, Communication Networks, Informational Spillovers, Coordination