The nature of organizational change and the value of headquarters is analyzed in a dynamic bargaining model. Organizational change can be either imposed, or voluntary and immediate, or voluntary and delayed. Headquarters derives it value from preventing surplus reducing endogenous commitments.dynamic bargaining game;headquarters;organizational change

Hendrikse, G.W.J.

English

Research Papers in Economics

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Organizational Change and Vested Interests

Organizational Change and Vested Interests

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Research Papers in Economics