This paper seeks to provide a response to Gaffney's analysis of teamwork by arguing that teamwork is morally neutral rather than a virtue in itself. This conclusion will be supported by examples which demonstrate how teamwork can develop and foster undesirable traits and practices such as resentment, contempt and the purely instrumental use of others in the achievement of desired ends

Ryall, Emily S

Name not available

This is a peer-reviewed, post-print (final draft post-refereeing) version of the following published document 
and is licensed under All Rights Reserved license:
Ryall, Emily S (2015) Why teamwork is not a virtue - a response to 
Gaffney. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 42 (1). pp. 57-62. ISSN 0094-
8705 
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2014.961163
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2014.961163
EPrint URI: http://eprints.glos.ac.uk/id/eprint/991
Disclaimer 
The University of Gloucestershire has obtained warranties from all depositors as to their title in the material 
deposited and as to their right to deposit such material.  
The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation or warranties of commercial utility, title, or fitness 
for a particular purpose or any other warranty, express or implied in respect of any material deposited.  
The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation that the use of the materials will not infringe any 
patent, copyright, trademark or other property or proprietary rights.  
The University of Gloucestershire accepts no liability for any infringement of intellectual property rights in any 
material deposited but will remove such material from public view pending investigation in the event of an 
allegation of any such infringement. 
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR TEXT.
  
This is a peer-reviewed, post-print (final draft post-refereeing) version of the following 
published document: 
Ryall, Emily S (2014). Why teamwork is not a virtue - 
a response to Gaffney. Journal of the Philosophy of 
Sport, 42 (1), 57-62. ISSN 0094-8705 
 
Published in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, and available online at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2014.961163 
We recommend you cite the published (post-print) version. 
The URL for the published version is 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2014.961163 
 
 
Disclaimer 
The University of Gloucestershire has obtained warranties from all depositors as to their title 
in the material deposited and as to their right to deposit such material. 
The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation or warranties of commercial 
utility, title, or fitness for a particular purpose or any other warranty, express or implied in 
respect of any material deposited. 
The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation that the use of the materials will 
not infringe any patent, copyright, trademark or other property or proprietary rights. 
The University of Gloucestershire accepts no liability for any infringement of intellectual 
property rights in any material deposited but will remove such material from public view 
pending investigation in the event of an allegation of any such infringement. 
 
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR TEXT. 
Teamwork in sport 
In his analysis of teamwork, Gaffney goes beyond presenting a purely instrumental and 
pragmatic conception (whereby an individual is more likely to achieve their aims if they work 
with others towards a mutual goal) and states that teamwork is a moral virtue in itself. It is 
this that I wish to dispute. I will present a case which demonstrates that teamwork can only be 
considered morally good in particular instances that are dependent upon other moral factors, 
and argue that there is nothing intrinsically virtuous about the concept of teamwork itself. As 
such, teamwork is morally neutral. In this, I will highlight aspects of teamwork which are 
considered undesirable; where feelings of resentment and contempt can develop and where an 
ethos that condones and sustains abusive practices can be fostered. Ultimately I will argue 
that when stripped to its essence, teamwork is purely an instrumental tool by which to 
achieve the (sporting) ends of success and victory. Any moral value that is attached to it 
comes from the way in which it is used and not from the tool itself. 
One of the fundamental tenets of good sport is that a contest should be constructed in such a 
way to allow for the fair testing of relevant characteristics (Loland 2002). So, if the contest is 
a 400m running race, then the test should determine who is able to run the fastest over 400m. 
Likewise, if the contest is a cycling race then it should determine who is able to cycle fastest 
over a set distance along a specified route. In this respect, victory should be meritocratically 
awarded to the individual who is most successful in performing the test. This aspect of sport 
is antecedent to Gaffney’s first principle of perfectionism whereby one must try to win. Good 
sport therefore, is based on a test of relevant characteristics whereby the outcome is 
dependent on who is able to perform this test the best. However, the notion of desert and 
perfectionism is not always the case when it comes to working within a team. 
Let us imagine that the two best riders in a cycling team (let us call them Team Instrumental) 
are both top ranked cyclists and each have the capability to win races. According to the 
conception of sport previously outlined, the winner should be determined by who is the 
fastest cyclist on the day of racing. Yet in this case, victory will not be meritocratically 
determined and these two riders will not have the same opportunity to win. Instead, the 
rider’s likelihood of winning is determined by Team Instrumental’s Sporting Director. She 
decides which rider will attempt to win the race and which team members will be used to 
support them1. It may be the case that rider #2 is most able to win (and would do so were the 
race a time trial) but she is told by the Sporting Director that she must aid rider #1 and 
sacrifice her own chance of winning. In this instance, rider #2 is explicitly ordered not to try 
her best to win; rather she must aid another rider in her pursuit of victory. This contradicts 
Gaffney’s first principle of perfectionism. Gaffney may respond to this by arguing that 
teamwork requires a temperance of one’s own aims and that #2 should assist #1 to victory for 
good of the team, and that they are working together for team victory rather than individual 
victory. Yet such a response seems inadequate. One might question why the good of team 
usurps the good of the individual. If a central principle of good sport is perfectionism, then 
thwarting an individual’s pursuit of it in the name of ‘teamwork’ seems to undermine it. 
Gaffney may well respond further that cycling is exceptional when compared to other ‘team’ 
sports since riders compete both as individuals and as team members. The few other sports 
that are similarly constructed are motor racing and some middle- and long-distance running 
races. Yet, there are many examples within team sports where the principle is similar: for 
instance, many invasion sports (such as soccer, hockey, rugby, etc.) are constructed in such a 
way that the freedom and potential of players is curtailed by others. One can give the 
example of a soccer player who is told that she must remain in defence and not push towards 
the goal to attempt to have a shot herself, or the rugby player who is told that she must play in 
the front five; a position which seldom handles the ball and rarely scores. 
An objection to this view points out that successful sport is dependent on players abiding by a 
set structure and recognising the different roles within a team, as chaos will otherwise reign. 
Here, Gaffney cites further principles of community and equality, in that though the specific 
roles may differ, athletes work together to achieve a mutual goal: bringing to mind the phrase 
‘no player is bigger than the team’. There is a further assumption that such recognition of 
collective efforts facilitates mutual respect, and perhaps even friendship. This seems to 
support the view that teamwork is therefore a moral virtue. Yet, the relationship between 
teamwork and respect is not mutually dependent. Teamwork can often foster negative 
attitudes and a lack of respect towards others. Let us return to the example of Team 
Instrumental. 
Rider #2 believes she is the best rider in the team and resents having to perform the duty of 
‘domestique’2 for #1. Similarly, Rider #1 has been the dominant rider in the team for several 
seasons and is resentful of #2’s challenge to her authority and status. Both riders feel negative 
towards one another and the relationship between #1 and #2 is antagonistic at best. Moreover, 
these negative feelings result in the attempt by both riders to denigrate each other’s position 
within the team by playing Machiavellian-style politics amongst the rest of the team. In this 
situation, there is certainly no love lost between the two teammates and both would feel a 
degree of schadenfreude if the other were to get a puncture or fall during a race. The 
necessity of being on the same team certainly does not engender friendship. 
One might argue that despite such enmity there is still a level of mutual respect. Both riders 
begrudgingly recognise each other’s talent and ability but each seeks to undermine it. On this 
level, teamwork is merely a veneer that hides an underlying animosity. It serves an 
instrumental purpose for riders #1 and #2 in that it supplies them with a professional contract, 
status and recognition but it does not facilitate other positive qualities that are often 
associated with teamwork; namely solidarity, friendship and true respect. As such, teamwork 
plays a purely instrumental role in ensuring other ends for the individual; it is not an end in 
itself. 
These examples demonstrate that the existence of others within a team deserves particular 
attention as it highlights a paradox. That a team necessarily comprises of a collection of 
individuals means that the presence of others cannot be ignored. Gaffney intimates that 
teamwork is beneficial in the way that it helps to develop the individual, and points to Mead’s 
(1962) relational construction of the self as a way of understanding this. Mead’s theory states 
that the individual can only be understood in terms of their relation to others.  However, an 
alternative interpretation of the presence of others is provided by Jean-Paul Sartre and is 
articulated by the phrase ‘hell is… other people’ (2000: 223). This recognises the 
insidiousness of being with others whereby we are constantly engaged in maintaining control 
over our image and the way in which others see us. For Sartre, the unique human capacity to 
define and redefine ourselves creates a tension in the presence of others, as they seek to limit 
this freedom by defining us in a way that is not of our choosing.    To use Sartre’s 
terminology, a ‘being-for-itself’ (a subject) is aware that others always see her as something - 
a ‘being-in-itself’, or an object. So others may label an individual as a ‘weak player’ or a 
‘coward’ or equally as a ‘team-player’ or ‘match winner’. Regardless whether these labels are 
seen as positive or negative, for Sartre, to accept these labels ascribed by others is to fall into 
Bad-faith. This conception of Bad-faith differs from the Kantian one outlined by Gaffney 
which demands us not to view others as objects. Instead, Sartre places responsibility on the 
individual to resist the labels that are given to us by others. The reason, as Sartre notes, is that 
“the ethics of duty is the ethics of slaves” (1992: 268) in which imperatives (such as those 
issued by Kant) necessarily, and by definition, reject the freedom of others and reinforce a 
transcendence (or way of being seen) by another. 
In the case of Team Instrumental, the riders who accept and happily play their role of 
‘domestiques’ can be said to be guilty of Bad-faith. The rider that happily plays the part of 
‘domestique’ in fulfilling the role of support rider and team-player is under the same illusion 
as Sartre’s waiter who enthusiastically and committedly serves drinks and accommodates his 
customers’ requests (Sartre, 2003).  This rider listens to the Sporting Director with keenness 
and carries out orders without question; after all, a ‘domestique’ is what she is. In contrast, 
the riders that see teamwork purely as an instrumental tool are able to better resist falling into 
Bad-faith. Yet, they will necessarily find themselves in an ongoing ‘battle of transcendence’ 
to avoid being pulled into the ‘drain hole’ (Sartre, 2003: 279) caused by the presence of 
others and their attempts to turn the subject into an object. Rather than helping to create the 
self, as Mead and Gaffney suggest, the presence of others can be seen as a way of limiting the 
individual. The existence of others, exacerbated by being part of a team, merely serves to 
make it more difficult to remain authentic and in Good-faith.  
In the examples given so far, Gaffney might assert that there is little evidence of teamwork 
despite the existence of a team. Teamwork, he is likely to say, is not simply being a member 
of a team, and a reluctant member at that; it requires a commitment to the team’s endeavours. 
So let us turn once again to Team Instrumental. Let us imagine that the animosity and 
resentment felt between riders #1 and #2 is noticed by the Sporting Director who releases #2 
from her contract. After all, one might argue, if two members of the team are unable to work 
together in pursuit of a common goal, it is not teamwork. As a result the team is now 
comprised of nine riders, all of whom are content with their roles and all of whom are 
committed to the team’s goal of getting rider #1 over the finish line first. Rider #9 is the 
newest member of the team. She is wholly committed to the other team members and to the 
team goals. She is happy to fulfil the role of ‘domestique’ and willingly puts to one side her 
own ambitions for the sake of the team. This attitude, Gaffney would undoubtedly argue, is 
the one upon which teamwork depends. Being a committed member of a team is virtuous as it 
limits selfishness and egotism whilst still driving towards athletic excellence and competitive 
success. Yet let us also imagine that within Team Instrumental there is a culture which 
promotes the success of the team over the well-being of the individual. In this culture, riders 
are expected to do anything required for team success. Although a keen and enthusiastic team 
member, rider #9 expresses concern at the expectation that she engages practices that she 
thinks are unethical and perhaps illegal. The consequence of her reluctance to embrace the 
team’s culture is that she finds herself side-lined and ostracised. Her commitment is 
questioned by the rest of the team and the Sporting Director suggests that she is not really the 
‘team-player’ that she indicates. So, persuaded by her love of cycling, the threat of losing her 
professional contract and the fear of not being part of the team, #9 decides that engaging in 
these illegal and dubious practices is the sacrifice she must make if she is to aid her team to 
victory. Though this conception of teamwork corresponds to the one set out by Gaffney, there 
seems to be little that is virtuous about it. As the team’s name suggests, the attitude it holds is 
one of instrumentalism; the players are treated as objects (or instruments) to attain the goal of 
victory. 
It seems then to take sport seriously, most notably at the elite or professional level, it is 
necessary to see others as objects that can help or hinder your aims. Nowhere is this more-so 
than in the role of coach or team-manager whereby one’s future is dependent on victory. It is 
perhaps here where the usefulness of teamwork can be seen most. I have previously argued 
that a coach must view her players as ‘beings-in-themselves’ in sporting contests (Ryall, 
2007). She has the role and responsibility of deciding who plays and in which position, in an 
attempt to achieve victory. She must decide which players will best meet the challenge and 
developing teamwork is an instrumental tool that assists her in doing this. The reason that 
cyclist #2 was released from the team was that she would not fulfil the role of ‘domestique’; 
she was not willing to work purposely as part of the team. Coaches need teamwork to oil the 
machinery for success. The way it is used is dependent on other factors and virtues that the 
coach may hold, but it is not a virtue in itself. 
It has been suggested that the concept of ‘teamwork’ is more ethically problematic than 
Gaffney suggests. Though he might be right in arguing that teamwork reigns-in explicit and 
overt self-interest and egotism, it may simply push them to a deeper level by masking other 
vices such as resentment and contempt. It seems difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the 
drive for excellence with a genuine respect for others. Indeed, Tuxill and Wigmore (1998) 
suggest that respect for others may be intrinsically impossible or self-contradictory in sport. 
Although they were specifically referring to sporting opponents; at an elite level, where there 
is a ruthless competition for places, it could equally apply to one’s own team-mates. 
Such a conception of teamwork may appear cynical and distasteful. After all, it is one of the 
key values of sport espoused as part of the Muscular Christianity movement in the late 
nineteenth century, and continues to be promoted by educationalists and politicians today. I 
have not argued that teamwork cannot be a way of promoting particular (positive) values. 
Gaffney is correct in saying that working with others towards a mutual goal can develop and 
highlight characteristics and traits that we value in others. However, this does not make 
teamwork itself a virtue, as it can also mask and aggravate other qualities that are not as 
positively regarded. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
LOLAND, S. 2002. Fair Play in Sport: A Moral Norm System. London: Routledge. 
MEAD, G.H. 1962. Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
TUXILL, C. and WIGMORE, S. 1998. “‘Merely Meat’ Respect for Persons in Sport and 
Games.” In Ethics and Sport, edited by M. Mcnamee and S. Parry, London: Routledge. 
RYALL, E. 2008. Being-on-the-bench: An existential analysis of the substitute in 
sport. Sports Ethics and Philosophy, 2(1), pp.56--70. 
SARTRE, J-P. 1992. Notebooks for an Ethics. London: University of Chicago Press. 
SARTRE, J-P. 2000. Huis Clos and Other Plays. London: Penguin. 
SARTRE, J-P. 2003. Being and Nothingness. London: Routledge. 
                                                          
NOTES 
 
1
 In cycling, energy savings can be made of up to 30% by using the ‘slipstream’ of other 
riders. Therefore, team events often designate one rider to be ‘towed’ along by other 
teammates using this method in order to conserve energy for the latter stage of the race. 
2
 The role of ‘domestique’ is a supporting one which often means far more than simply aiding 
a teammate to victory in the race itself. 


Why teamwork is not a virtue - a response to Gaffney

University of Gloucestershire Research Repository 

This is a peer-reviewed, post-print (final draft post-refereeing) version of the following published document:Ryall, Emily S (2015) Why teamwork is not a virtue - a response to Gaffney. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 42 (1). pp. 57-62. ISSN 0094-8705 Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2014.961163DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2014.961163EPrint URI: http://eprints.glos.ac.uk/id/eprint/991Disclaimer The University of Gloucestershire has obtained warranties from all depositors as to their title in the material deposited and as to their right to deposit such material.  The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation or warranties of commercial utility, title, or fitness for a particular purpose or any other warranty, express or implied in respect of any material deposited.  The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation that the use of the materials will not infringe any patent, copyright, trademark or other property or proprietary rights.  The University of Gloucestershire accepts no liability for any infringement of intellectual property rights in any material deposited but will remove such material from public view pending investigation in the event of an allegation of any such infringement. PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR TEXT.  This is a peer-reviewed, post-print (final draft post-refereeing) version of the following published document: Ryall, Emily S (2014). Why teamwork is not a virtue - a response to Gaffney. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 42 (1), 57-62. ISSN 0094-8705  Published in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, and available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2014.961163 We recommend you cite the published (post-print) version. The URL for the published version is http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2014.961163   Disclaimer The University of Gloucestershire has obtained warranties from all depositors as to their title in the material deposited and as to their right to deposit such material. The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation or warranties of commercial utility, title, or fitness for a particular purpose or any other warranty, express or implied in respect of any material deposited. The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation that the use of the materials will not infringe any patent, copyright, trademark or other property or proprietary rights. The University of Gloucestershire accepts no liability for any infringement of intellectual property rights in any material deposited but will remove such material from public view pending investigation in the event of an allegation of any such infringement.  PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR TEXT. Teamwork in sport In his analysis of teamwork, Gaffney goes beyond presenting a purely instrumental and pragmatic conception (whereby an individual is more likely to achieve their aims if they work with others towards a mutual goal) and states that teamwork is a moral virtue in itself. It is this that I wish to dispute. I will present a case which demonstrates that teamwork can only be considered morally good in particular instances that are dependent upon other moral factors, and argue that there is nothing intrinsically virtuous about the concept of teamwork itself. As such, teamwork is morally neutral. In this, I will highlight aspects of teamwork which are considered undesirable; where feelings of resentment and contempt can develop and where an ethos that condones and sustains abusive practices can be fostered. Ultimately I will argue that when stripped to its essence, teamwork is purely an instrumental tool by which to achieve the (sporting) ends of success and victory. Any moral value that is attached to it comes from the way in which it is used and not from the tool itself. One of the fundamental tenets of good sport is that a contest should be constructed in such a way to allow for the fair testing of relevant characteristics (Loland 2002). So, if the contest is a 400m running race, then the test should determine who is able to run the fastest over 400m. Likewise, if the contest is a cycling race then it should determine who is able to cycle fastest over a set distance along a specified route. In this respect, victory should be meritocratically awarded to the individual who is most successful in performing the test. This aspect of sport is antecedent to Gaffney’s first principle of perfectionism whereby one must try to win. Good sport therefore, is based on a test of relevant characteristics whereby the outcome is dependent on who is able to perform this test the best. However, the notion of desert and perfectionism is not always the case when it comes to working within a team. Let us imagine that the two best riders in a cycling team (let us call them Team Instrumental) are both top ranked cyclists and each have the capability to win races. According to the conception of sport previously outlined, the winner should be determined by who is the fastest cyclist on the day of racing. Yet in this case, victory will not be meritocratically determined and these two riders will not have the same opportunity to win. Instead, the rider’s likelihood of winning is determined by Team Instrumental’s Sporting Director. She decides which rider will attempt to win the race and which team members will be used to support them1. It may be the case that rider #2 is most able to win (and would do so were the race a time trial) but she is told by the Sporting Director that she must aid rider #1 and sacrifice her own chance of winning. In this instance, rider #2 is explicitly ordered not to try her best to win; rather she must aid another rider in her pursuit of victory. This contradicts Gaffney’s first principle of perfectionism. Gaffney may respond to this by arguing that teamwork requires a temperance of one’s own aims and that #2 should assist #1 to victory for good of the team, and that they are working together for team victory rather than individual victory. Yet such a response seems inadequate. One might question why the good of team usurps the good of the individual. If a central principle of good sport is perfectionism, then thwarting an individual’s pursuit of it in the name of ‘teamwork’ seems to undermine it. Gaffney may well respond further that cycling is exceptional when compared to other ‘team’ sports since riders compete both as individuals and as team members. The few other sports that are similarly constructed are motor racing and some middle- and long-distance running races. Yet, there are many examples within team sports where the principle is similar: for instance, many invasion sports (such as soccer, hockey, rugby, etc.) are constructed in such a way that the freedom and potential of players is curtailed by others. One can give the example of a soccer player who is told that she must remain in defence and not push towards the goal to attempt to have a shot herself, or the rugby player who is told that she must play in the front five; a position which seldom handles the ball and rarely scores. An objection to this view points out that successful sport is dependent on players abiding by a set structure and recognising the different roles within a team, as chaos will otherwise reign. Here, Gaffney cites further principles of community and equality, in that though the specific roles may differ, athletes work together to achieve a mutual goal: bringing to mind the phrase ‘no player is bigger than the team’. There is a further assumption that such recognition of collective efforts facilitates mutual respect, and perhaps even friendship. This seems to support the view that teamwork is therefore a moral virtue. Yet, the relationship between teamwork and respect is not mutually dependent. Teamwork can often foster negative attitudes and a lack of respect towards others. Let us return to the example of Team Instrumental. Rider #2 believes she is the best rider in the team and resents having to perform the duty of ‘domestique’2 for #1. Similarly, Rider #1 has been the dominant rider in the team for several seasons and is resentful of #2’s challenge to her authority and status. Both riders feel negative towards one another and the relationship between #1 and #2 is antagonistic at best. Moreover, these negative feelings result in the attempt by both riders to denigrate each other’s position within the team by playing Machiavellian-style politics amongst the rest of the team. In this situation, there is certainly no love lost between the two teammates and both would feel a degree of schadenfreude if the other were to get a puncture or fall during a race. The necessity of being on the same team certainly does not engender friendship. One might argue that despite such enmity there is still a level of mutual respect. Both riders begrudgingly recognise each other’s talent and ability but each seeks to undermine it. On this level, teamwork is merely a veneer that hides an underlying animosity. It serves an instrumental purpose for riders #1 and #2 in that it supplies them with a professional contract, status and recognition but it does not facilitate other positive qualities that are often associated with teamwork; namely solidarity, friendship and true respect. As such, teamwork plays a purely instrumental role in ensuring other ends for the individual; it is not an end in itself. These examples demonstrate that the existence of others within a team deserves particular attention as it highlights a paradox. That a team necessarily comprises of a collection of individuals means that the presence of others cannot be ignored. Gaffney intimates that teamwork is beneficial in the way that it helps to develop the individual, and points to Mead’s (1962) relational construction of the self as a way of understanding this. Mead’s theory states that the individual can only be understood in terms of their relation to others.  However, an alternative interpretation of the presence of others is provided by Jean-Paul Sartre and is articulated by the phrase ‘hell is… other people’ (2000: 223). This recognises the insidiousness of being with others whereby we are constantly engaged in maintaining control over our image and the way in which others see us. For Sartre, the unique human capacity to define and redefine ourselves creates a tension in the presence of others, as they seek to limit this freedom by defining us in a way that is not of our choosing.    To use Sartre’s terminology, a ‘being-for-itself’ (a subject) is aware that others always see her as something - a ‘being-in-itself’, or an object. So others may label an individual as a ‘weak player’ or a ‘coward’ or equally as a ‘team-player’ or ‘match winner’. Regardless whether these labels are seen as positive or negative, for Sartre, to accept these labels ascribed by others is to fall into Bad-faith. This conception of Bad-faith differs from the Kantian one outlined by Gaffney which demands us not to view others as objects. Instead, Sartre places responsibility on the individual to resist the labels that are given to us by others. The reason, as Sartre notes, is that “the ethics of duty is the ethics of slaves” (1992: 268) in which imperatives (such as those issued by Kant) necessarily, and by definition, reject the freedom of others and reinforce a transcendence (or way of being seen) by another. In the case of Team Instrumental, the riders who accept and happily play their role of ‘domestiques’ can be said to be guilty of Bad-faith. The rider that happily plays the part of ‘domestique’ in fulfilling the role of support rider and team-player is under the same illusion as Sartre’s waiter who enthusiastically and committedly serves drinks and accommodates his customers’ requests (Sartre, 2003).  This rider listens to the Sporting Director with keenness and carries out orders without question; after all, a ‘domestique’ is what she is. In contrast, the riders that see teamwork purely as an instrumental tool are able to better resist falling into Bad-faith. Yet, they will necessarily find themselves in an ongoing ‘battle of transcendence’ to avoid being pulled into the ‘drain hole’ (Sartre, 2003: 279) caused by the presence of others and their attempts to turn the subject into an object. Rather than helping to create the self, as Mead and Gaffney suggest, the presence of others can be seen as a way of limiting the individual. The existence of others, exacerbated by being part of a team, merely serves to make it more difficult to remain authentic and in Good-faith.  In the examples given so far, Gaffney might assert that there is little evidence of teamwork despite the existence of a team. Teamwork, he is likely to say, is not simply being a member of a team, and a reluctant member at that; it requires a commitment to the team’s endeavours. So let us turn once again to Team Instrumental. Let us imagine that the animosity and resentment felt between riders #1 and #2 is noticed by the Sporting Director who releases #2 from her contract. After all, one might argue, if two members of the team are unable to work together in pursuit of a common goal, it is not teamwork. As a result the team is now comprised of nine riders, all of whom are content with their roles and all of whom are committed to the team’s goal of getting rider #1 over the finish line first. Rider #9 is the newest member of the team. She is wholly committed to the other team members and to the team goals. She is happy to fulfil the role of ‘domestique’ and willingly puts to one side her own ambitions for the sake of the team. This attitude, Gaffney would undoubtedly argue, is the one upon which teamwork depends. Being a committed member of a team is virtuous as it limits selfishness and egotism whilst still driving towards athletic excellence and competitive success. Yet let us also imagine that within Team Instrumental there is a culture which promotes the success of the team over the well-being of the individual. In this culture, riders are expected to do anything required for team success. Although a keen and enthusiastic team member, rider #9 expresses concern at the expectation that she engages practices that she thinks are unethical and perhaps illegal. The consequence of her reluctance to embrace the team’s culture is that she finds herself side-lined and ostracised. Her commitment is questioned by the rest of the team and the Sporting Director suggests that she is not really the ‘team-player’ that she indicates. So, persuaded by her love of cycling, the threat of losing her professional contract and the fear of not being part of the team, #9 decides that engaging in these illegal and dubious practices is the sacrifice she must make if she is to aid her team to victory. Though this conception of teamwork corresponds to the one set out by Gaffney, there seems to be little that is virtuous about it. As the team’s name suggests, the attitude it holds is one of instrumentalism; the players are treated as objects (or instruments) to attain the goal of victory. It seems then to take sport seriously, most notably at the elite or professional level, it is necessary to see others as objects that can help or hinder your aims. Nowhere is this more-so than in the role of coach or team-manager whereby one’s future is dependent on victory. It is perhaps here where the usefulness of teamwork can be seen most. I have previously argued that a coach must view her players as ‘beings-in-themselves’ in sporting contests (Ryall, 2007). She has the role and responsibility of deciding who plays and in which position, in an attempt to achieve victory. She must decide which players will best meet the challenge and developing teamwork is an instrumental tool that assists her in doing this. The reason that cyclist #2 was released from the team was that she would not fulfil the role of ‘domestique’; she was not willing to work purposely as part of the team. Coaches need teamwork to oil the machinery for success. The way it is used is dependent on other factors and virtues that the coach may hold, but it is not a virtue in itself. It has been suggested that the concept of ‘teamwork’ is more ethically problematic than Gaffney suggests. Though he might be right in arguing that teamwork reigns-in explicit and overt self-interest and egotism, it may simply push them to a deeper level by masking other vices such as resentment and contempt. It seems difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the drive for excellence with a genuine respect for others. Indeed, Tuxill and Wigmore (1998) suggest that respect for others may be intrinsically impossible or self-contradictory in sport. Although they were specifically referring to sporting opponents; at an elite level, where there is a ruthless competition for places, it could equally apply to one’s own team-mates. Such a conception of teamwork may appear cynical and distasteful. After all, it is one of the key values of sport espoused as part of the Muscular Christianity movement in the late nineteenth century, and continues to be promoted by educationalists and politicians today. I have not argued that teamwork cannot be a way of promoting particular (positive) values. Gaffney is correct in saying that working with others towards a mutual goal can develop and highlight characteristics and traits that we value in others. However, this does not make teamwork itself a virtue, as it can also mask and aggravate other qualities that are not as positively regarded.  BIBLIOGRAPHY LOLAND, S. 2002. Fair Play in Sport: A Moral Norm System. London: Routledge. MEAD, G.H. 1962. Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. TUXILL, C. and WIGMORE, S. 1998. “‘Merely Meat’ Respect for Persons in Sport and Games.” In Ethics and Sport, edited by M. Mcnamee and S. Parry, London: Routledge. RYALL, E. 2008. Being-on-the-bench: An existential analysis of the substitute in sport. Sports Ethics and Philosophy, 2(1), pp.56--70. SARTRE, J-P. 1992. Notebooks for an Ethics. London: University of Chicago Press. SARTRE, J-P. 2000. Huis Clos and Other Plays. London: Penguin. SARTRE, J-P. 2003. Being and Nothingness. London: Routledge.                                                           NOTES  1 In cycling, energy savings can be made of up to 30% by using the ‘slipstream’ of other riders. Therefore, team events often designate one rider to be ‘towed’ along by other teammates using this method in order to conserve energy for the latter stage of the race. 2 The role of ‘domestique’ is a supporting one which often means far more than simply aiding a teammate to victory in the race itself. 

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Why teamwork is not a virtue - a response to Gaffney

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