Eventology versus contemporary theories of uncertainty

Abstract

The development of probability theory together with the Bayesian approach in the three last centuries is caused by two factors: the variability of the physical phenomena and partial ignorance about them. As now it is standard to believe [Dubois, 2007], the nature of these key factors is so various, that their descriptions are required special uncertainty theories, which differ from the probability theory and the Bayesian credo, and provide a better account of the various facets of uncertainty by putting together probabilistic and set-valued representations of information to catch a distinction between variability and ignorance. Eventology [Vorobyev, 2007], a new direction of probability theory and philosophy, offers the original event approach to the description of variability and ignorance, entering an agent, together with his/her beliefs, directly in the frameworks of scientific research in the form of eventological distribution of his/her own events. This allows eventology, by putting together probabilistic and set-event representation of information and philosophical concept of event as co-being [Bakhtin, 1920], to provide a unified strong account of various aspects of uncertainty catching distinction between variability and ignorance and opening an opportunity to define imprecise probability as a probability of imprecise event in the mathematical frameworks of Kolmogorov's probability theory [Kolmogorov, 1933].uncertainty, probability, event, co-being, eventology, imprecise event