In this paper, we establish the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium for games with n persons in infinite dimensional strategy spaces in the case where the payoff function of each player is quasi-concave. Moreover, we study the continuity of Berge's strong equilibrium correspondence and prove that most of Berge's strong games are essential.Nash equilibrium, strong Berge equilibrium, fixed point, essential games.

Messaoud Deghdak

Monique Florenzano

English

Research Papers in Economics

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On the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium

http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/61/18/51/PDF/11039.pdf

On the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium

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Research Papers in Economics