The purpose of this paper is to present a structural specification of the Shapley- Shubik and Banzhaf power indices in a weighted voting rule. We compare them in term of the cardinality of the sets of power vectors (PV). This is done in different situations where the quota or the number of seats are fixed or not.Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, power index, power vectors.

Bertrand Tchantcho

Fabrice Barthelemy

Mathieu Martin

English

Research Papers in Economics

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Some conjectures on the two main power indices

http://www.u-cergy.fr/thema/repec/2011-14.pdf

Some conjectures on the two main power indices

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Research Papers in Economics