Financial services industry ; Bank supervision ; Industrial policy

Randall S. Kroszner

English

Research Papers in Economics

34 The Economics and Politics of Financial Modernization

A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.”

Are Legislators Ideologues or the Agents of

Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance,

Bureaucracy and Representative Government.

Chicago Studies in the Political Economy.

Congress: A Political-Economic History of RollCall Voting.

Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting.”

Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance.”

De Jure Interstate Banking: Why Only Now?”

Does Political Ambiguity Pay? Corporate Campaign Contributions and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation.”

Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge:

Finance and Growth:

High Court: States Must Let Banks Sell Insurance.” American Banker,

Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor:

Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from

Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after

Is It Better to Forgive than to Receive? Repudiation of the Gold Indexation Clause

Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation,”

Is the GlassSteagall Act Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking before

Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House.

Legislator Voting and Shirking:

Less Is More in the New International Financial Architecture.” In

Organization Structure and Credibility: Evidence from Commercial Bank Securities Activities before the GlassSteagall Act.”

Perceptions and the Politics of Finance:

Political Intervention in Debt Contracts: Moratoria and Bailouts.” Princeton University working paper,

Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. Ann Arbor:

Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview.” In

Regulatory Incentives and the Thrift Crisis: Dividends, Mutual-to-Stock Conversions,

Rethinking Banking Regulation: A Review of the Historical Evidence.”

Strong Managers, Weak Owners.

The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation.”

The Enduring Nineteenth-Century Battle for Economic Regulation: The Interstate Commerce Act Revisited.”

The Evolution of Universal Banking and Its Regulation

The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Bank Branch Deregulation.”

The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignments in the Modern House. Chicago:

The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as

The Legacy of the Separation of Banking and

The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge:

The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. Chicago:

The Making of Economic Policy: A Transactions-Cost Politics Perspective.

The Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance.”

The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation.”

The Political Economy of American Bankruptcy: The Evidence from Roll-Call Voting, 1800-1978.” Princeton University working paper,

The Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation in the U.S.”

The Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulatory Reform

The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance.”

The Politics and Economics of Redistribution and Efficiency.”

Toward a More General Theory of Regulation.”

Towards a Tax Constitution for Leviathan.”

Understanding Economic Policy Reform.”

Were the Good Old Days that Good? Changes

What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions.”

What Is Optimal Financial Regulation?” A Study Prepared for the Government Official Inquiry on the Competitiveness of the Swedish Financial Sector,

The economics and politics of financial modernization

http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/00v06n4/0010kros.pdf

The economics and politics of financial modernization

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