Alessandra Casella

Aniol Llorente-Saguer

Thomas R. Palfrey

English

Research Papers in Economics

A Simple Mechanism for Resolving Conﬂict”,

A Utility Theory of Representative Government”,

and C.Holt

Asset Valuation in an Experimental Market&quot;,

Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents,&quot;

Bribing Voters”,

Buying Several Indivisible goods”,

Centralized Vote-Trading”,

Collective Choice,

Competitive Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Indivisibilities”,

Equilibrium and Eﬃciency in an Organized Vote Market”,

Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Multiple Indivisible Commodities and Money”,

Experimental Auction Markets and the Walrasian Hypothesis&quot;,

General Competitive Analysis.

Handbook of Experimental Economics,P r i n c e t o n , N.J.:Princeton

Incentives and Incomplete Information”,

Incentives to Cultivate Favorite Minorities under Alternative Voting Systems”,

Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics&quot;,

Information Aggregation through Voting and Vote-Trading”,

Logrolling and Budget Allocation Games”,

Logrolling, Arrow Paradox and Cyclical Preferences”,

Logrolling, Arrow Paradox and Decision Rules:

Mechanisms for Eﬃcient Voting with Private Information about Preferences”, mimeo,

Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science&quot;,

Minorities and Storable Votes”,

On the robustness of majority rule”,

Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions”,

Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard&quot;,

Qualitative Voting”,

Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in First Price Auctions&quot;,

Quasi-Equilibria in Markets with Non-Convex Preferences”,

Risk Averse Behavior in Generalized Matching Pennies Games&quot;,

Sour Notes on the Theory of Vote Trading”,

Storable Votes”,

The Approximation of Eﬃcient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes.&quot;

The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor:

The Possibility of a Social Welfare Function:

The possibility of a social welfare function”,

Vote Buying: General Elections”,

Vote Buying: Legislatures and Lobbying,”,

Vote Trading: An Experimental Study”,

Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes

http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4661465000000000143.pdf

Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes

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Research Papers in Economics