We show that multiple equilibria exist in a model of bank run with moral hazard. Furthermore, this is true even with noisy signals on the economic fundamentals. We argue that the conditions under which this happens can arise naturally in models of banking with moral hazard problem.banking, fundamentals, signals, equilibria

Boonprakaikawe, Juntip

S. Ghosal

English

Research Papers in Economics

A theory of the onset of currency attacks”, in Agenor et.al (edited)

Are currency crisis self-fulﬁlling?”,

Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity”,

Currency crisis, sunspots, and Markov-switching regimes”,

Demand Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs”, mimeo,

Discussion of Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin’s Rethinking multiple equilibria in macroeconomic modeling”,

Discussion”, in Agenor et.al (edited)

Does one Soros make a diﬀerence? The role of a large trader in currency crisis”,

Emergency liquidity assistance for international banks”, in Threats to international ﬁnancial stability, edited by R.Portes

European exchange credibility before the fall”,

Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: A Canonical Model”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.6606.

Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring”,

Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications”,

International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability”,

Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problem”,

Microeconomics of Banking”,

Monsoonal Eﬀects, Spillovers, and Contagion”,

Moral Hazard and Observability”,

Narrow Banking meets the Diamond-Dybvig Model”, Federal Reserve Bank of

On the need for an International Lender of Last Resort”,

Rational and self-fulﬁlling balance of payments crisis”,

Self-fulﬁlling Risk Predictions: an application to speculative attacks”,

Shin (2001a): “Coordination risk and the price of debt”, forthcoming in European Economic Review.

Shin (2001b): “Rethinking Multiple equilibria in Macroeconomic Modelling”,

The Asian Financial Crisis”,

The Mexican peso crisis: Sudden death or death foretold?”,

The Pricing of Bonds and Bank loans in International Markets”,

The Role of (Non)transparency in a Currency Crisis”, mimeo,

Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-fulﬁlling Currency Attacks”,

Why do banks need a central bank”,

Moral Hazard in a model of Bank Run with Noisy Signals

http://repec.org/res2003/Boonprakaikawe.pdf

Moral Hazard in a model of Bank Run with Noisy Signals

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

Research Papers in Economics