Bochet, Olivier

Sakai, Toyotaka

English

Research Papers in Economics

Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods.

Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods.

Choice correspondences for public goods.

Egalitarian equivalent allocations: a new concept of economic equity.

Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules.

Games of fair division.

Groves' scheme on restricted domains.

House allocation with transfers.

Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods.

Implementation in bounded strategies: a look at bounded mechanisms.

Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains.

in press. Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes. Social Choice and Welfare.

Incentives in teams.

Large indivisibilities: an analysis with respect to price equilibrium and fairness.

Manipulation and the Pareto rule.

Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance.

Manipulation of social choice functions.

Manipulation of social decision functions.

Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result.

Maximin strategies and elicitation of preferences. In: Laffont,

Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences.

Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules.

Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality.

No-envy and consistency in economies with indivisible goods.

Nonmanipulable multi-valued social decision functions.

On definitions of manipulation of social choice functions. In: Laffont,

On the equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness.

On the stability of sincere voting situations.

Resource allocation and the public sector.

Stability of sincere voting under some classes of non-binary group decision procedures.

Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard–Sattherthwaite generalized.

Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good.

Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains.

Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money.

Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.

Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions.

Strategy-proofness and social choice functions without single-valuedness.

Strongly nonmanipulable multi-valued collective choice rules.

The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible.

The manipulation of social choice mechanisms that do not leave too much to chance.

Theory of Fair Allocation.

Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities.

http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=11915

Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities.

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Research Papers in Economics