Recapitalization in an Economy with State-Owned Banks - A DSGE Framework

Abstract

We simulate a DSGE model with state owned banks to analyze the impact of bank recapitalization as a policy action in response to loan defaults by firms. As a special case, we calibrate the model to India, an emerging economy with state-owned banks facing a minimum investment requirement in safe assets and a sectoral lending requirement. We analyze two different scenarios of government infused recapitalization - an unconditional transfer to banks and an "equity in exchange for transfer". Our analysis shows that a government infused recapitalization in response to a negative TFP shock may increase output in the short run. However, there is a welfare loss in both cases, although higher for the unconditional transfers as compared with the "equity in exchange for transfer". Our analysis suggests that while bank recapitalization is a welcome move to kick-start credit creation, capital formation and growth, especially during a cyclical downturn, there is need for appropriate policy vigil to protect the quality of public expenditure in the social sector that matters for welfare in the long run