A major constraint on trade liberalization in many countries is the prospective loss of government revenue.Recent results, however, have established a simple and appealing strategy for overcoming this difficulty, whilst still realizing the efficiency gains from liberalization, in small, competitive economies: combining tariff cuts with point-for-point increases in destination-based consumption taxes unambiguously increases both national welfare and total government revenue.This note explores the implications of imperfect competition for this strategy.Examples are easily found in which this strategy unambiguously reduces domestic welfare.tariffs;tax reform;imperfect competition

Keen, M.

Ligthart, J.E.

English

Research Papers in Economics

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 2004–78 
 
 
 
COORDINATING TARIFF REDUCTION AND DOMESTIC TAX 
REFORM UNDER IMPERFECT COMPETITION 
 
By M. Keen, J. E. Ligthart 
 
May 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 0924-7815  
 
Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform under  
Imperfect Competition  
 
 
 
Michael Keen
∗ and Jenny E. Ligthart
† 
 
 
 
This Version: May 2004 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A major constraint on trade liberalization in many countries is the prospective loss of 
government revenue. Recent results, however, have established a simple and appealing 
strategy for overcoming this difficulty, whilst still realizing the efficiency gains from 
liberalization, in small, competitive economies: combining tariff cuts with point-for-point 
increases in destination-based consumption taxes unambiguously increases both national 
welfare and total government revenue. This note explores the implications of imperfect 
competition for this strategy. Examples are easily found in which this strategy 
unambiguously reduces domestic welfare.   
 
 
Keywords: Tariff reform; Tax reform; Imperfect competition. 
 
JEL Classification: F12; F13; H20 
 
Acknowledgement: We are grateful to the editor and a referee for useful comments. Errors 
and opinions are ours alone, not necessarily those of the staff, management or Executive 
Directors of the International Monetary Fund. 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗ Corresponding Author: Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC 20431, E-
mail: mkeen@imf.org. 
 
† Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The 
Netherlands, E-mail: j.ligthart@uvt.nl. 
   - 1 - 
 
1. Introduction 
Many emerging market and developing countries have embarked on a strategy of cutting 
tariffs in order to improve the allocation of their productive resources, with the current Doha 
round of trade negotiations adding further impetus to the process. But the potential revenue 
losses from this have often been a major concern to governments contemplating such trade 
liberalization, especially those facing major fiscal imbalances.
1 This naturally leads to a 
search for alternative domestic sources of revenue, often in the form of indirect taxes. For 
example, tariff reduction in Morocco and the Philippines during the mid-1980s was 
accompanied by the introduction of a value-added tax (VAT); and in 1995 Senegal 
successfully lowered tariffs whilst simultaneously refining its VAT.  
Despite the many practical examples pointing to its importance, the theoretical literature 
has paid little attention to the interaction between trade reform and domestic tax reform. A 
number of authors (e.g., Michael et al. (1993); Falvey (1994); Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994); 
and Tsuneki (1995)) have examined the welfare and revenue effects of integrated tax-tariff 
reforms for small, competitive economies. In that same context, Keen and Ligthart (2002) 
show that a simple strategy of coordinated tax-tariff reform in which reductions in tariffs are 
exactly offset by increases in consumption taxes—so leaving consumer prices unchanged—
has extremely attractive properties: it unambiguously improves domestic welfare and raises 
government revenue.
2 They also show, however, that increasingly stringent conditions are 
required to secure such “win-win” outcomes from this reform strategy when allowance is 
made for important features of reality such as non-tradable goods and intermediate inputs. 
None of these papers, however, considers the implications for this strategy of imperfect 
competition in the product market, an issue likely to be important in a range of contexts, not   - 2 - 
 
least in emerging market and developing countries.
3 These implications are the concern of 
this note. 
It is well known that policy reforms which are welfare improving under perfect 
competition may be undesirable in a setting of imperfect competition. This note shows very 
starkly that this is indeed the case for the strategy of coordinated tariff and domestic tax 
reform just described. To establish this cautionary result, it suffices to prove the point for one 
particular model of imperfect competition. We do so here for a simple and popular model of 
international Cournot duopoly, a slight variant of that familiar from Dixit (1984) and Brander 
and Spencer (1984). Two tax-tariff reform strategies are considered, both mimicking that 
found by Ligthart and Keen (2002) to be unambiguously beneficial under perfect 
competition: (i) tariff cuts combined with one-for-one increases in consumption taxes; and 
(ii) tariff cuts combined with increases in consumption taxes so as to keep the consumer price 
constant. Both are shown to strictly reduce overall (domestic) welfare.  
 
2. The Basic Model 
The framework is a simple general equilibrium model of two tradable goods and two 
countries. In the background, there is a numeraire bearing (by normalization) no tax or tariff, 
traded competitively, and produced using a single factor under constant returns to scale. The 
home market for this good is served by two firms, one domestic and the other foreign, 
sharing the same downward-sloping demand curve for their (homogeneous) product. The two 
firms are identical, having constant marginal cost (reflecting also the assumptions on the 
numeraire sector), c, and fixed cost F. They face the same destination-based consumption 
tax, t, but the foreign firm also pays a tariff, τ, imposed by the home country.
4 There are no   - 3 - 
 
transport costs. Profits of the home and foreign firms,
5 Π and Π
* respectively, are thus given 
by: 
  
*
** *
() ,
() ,
qX X t c X F
qX X t c X F τ
 Π= + − − − 
 Π= + −−− − 
      ( 1 )  
where X denotes output of the domestic firm, q(.) is the inverse demand curve relating the 
consumer price to world output (with q <   0 , ′  where a prime denotes a derivative) and foreign 
variables are indicated by an asterisk. The home consumer’s preferences are described by an 
indirect utility function v(q)  +  m, with v (q) < 0, ′  where m denotes lump-sum income and ν is 
quadratic: thus inverse demand is linear, and all income effects are concentrated in the 
untaxed numeraire. It is also assumed that  t and τ are both strictly positive in the pre-reform 
equilibrium. 
Cournot-Nash behavior implies the first-order conditions: 
  
*
*
*
d
() 0 ,
d
d
() 0 .
d
qX q t c
X
qX q t c
X
τ
Π ′ =+ − + =
Π ′ =+ − + + =
      ( 2 )  
It is assumed that both firms are active in the initial equilibrium, for which it is evidently 
necessary that  0 q - t -   - c  >   . τ  
  Perturbing the system (2) for an arbitrary change in taxes and tariffs gives: 
  
*
d 21 d 1
.
12 d d 3 d
X t
t q X τ
−   
=    ′ −+   
      ( 3 )    - 4 - 
 
An increase in the consumption tax thus increases both firms’ marginal costs and so reduces 
both their outputs. Raising the tariff depresses production in the foreign country whilst 
increasing that at home.   
 Total revenue of the home government (from both the consumption tax and tariff), 
  
** () , Gt XX X τ =++         ( 4 )  
is assumed to be returned to the consumer as a lump-sum transfer, as is the profit income of 
the home firm. Thus, home welfare is given by: 
  
** () ( ) . Wv q t XX X τ =+ Π + ++      ( 5 )  
 
3. Welfare and Revenue Effects of Tax-Tariff Reforms 
The strategy for coordinated tax-tariff reforms that Keen and Ligthart (2002) show to be 
unambiguously beneficial for the small, competitive economy can be characterized in either 
of two ways: as involving equal but opposite changes in consumption taxes and tariffs (that 
is, d  = -d   >  0 t τ ), or as leaving consumer prices unchanged in the face of a tariff cut (that is, 
d =  0 ) . q  For the small, competitive economy of previous studies, these two characterizations 
are precisely equivalent. For the imperfectly competitive economy here, however, they are 
not: from (3) it is evident that setting d  = -d   >  0 t τ will change the consumer price (because it 
will change world output,
* X + X ).  
The two results which follow show that neither kind of reform is necessarily desirable in 
the presence of imperfect competition; indeed, in the model considered here both reforms 
actually reduce national welfare.  
Proposition 1 establishes this for the first characterization of the reform:   - 5 - 
 
PROPOSITION 1. A small tariff cut combined with an increase in the consumption tax of the 
same absolute magnitude strictly reduces national welfare. 
 
Proof: Perturbing (5) yields 
   dd d d , Wv q G ′ = +Π +       ( 6 )    
with 
* d( d d ) q=q X X ′ +  and, by Roy’s identity (normalizing the marginal utility of income to 
unity), 
* v=- ( X  +  X ) . ′  Setting d +  d  =   0 , t τ  note too, from (3), that then 
  
* 2
d2 d d 0 ,
3
XX t
q
=− = <
′
       ( 7 )  
so that the world price increases (dq = (1/3)dt > 0),
6 but by less than does the consumption 
tax. The first component of welfare, v, falls: 
  
* d  = -(  +  )d  < 0, vX X q        ( 8 )    
where use is made of  . v′  The change in profits of the home firm can be derived by perturbing 
(1) and using (7): 
   []
1
dd 0 . qtct
q
Π= − − <
′
       ( 9 )  
Differentiating (4), using (7) and d +  d  =   0 , t τ  yields: 
  
** d d (d d ) d ( )d GX t t X t X t X ττ =+ + ++ +       
     []
1
3( ) d .
3
qct tt
q
τ =− − − + −
′       ( 1 0 )  
Substituting the expressions for dq, dG, and dΠ into (6), and noting from (2) that 
* 23 ( ) 0 qc q X qct t ττ ′ −− = −−− ++>, one finds   - 6 - 
 
  
* 1
d2 d 0 ,
3
Wq c q X t
q
′  = −− <  ′
      (11) 
and thus home welfare falls. QED 
 
This result runs directly counter to that for the competitive, small economy in Keen and 
Ligthart (2002). Under the conditions there, the same reform as in Proposition 1: leaves the 
consumer price unchanged; moves domestic production closer to the level that maximizes the 
value of output at world prices; and, since the base of the domestic consumption tax is 
broader than that of the tariff, increases government revenue. Here, it can be seen from (1) 
that while the reform has no direct impact on the output of the foreign firm it reduces that of 
the domestic firm; thus the consumer price rises, reducing consumer welfare. Because 
outputs of the two firms are strategic substitutes, the contraction of the home firm’s output 
induces an indirect expansion of foreign output; and this, together with the higher 
consumption tax rate, means that domestic profits also fall. From (10), government revenue 
will increase only if the tariff rate is high enough relative to the rate of consumption taxation 
for the increased tariff revenue (from a greater volume of imports) to offset the consumption 
tax revenue lost from the decline in consumption. In any event, however, the fall in domestic 
profits outweighs any gain in revenue if initial tariffs are not too high, that is if τ < t. With a 
higher consumer price and lower lump-sum income, domestic welfare unambiguously falls. 
The second strategy of tax-tariff reform is to leave the consumer price unchanged, 
requiring that world output remains constant. But this too is certain to reduce welfare: 
   - 7 - 
 
PROPOSITION 2. An increase in the consumption tax combined with such a reduction in the 
tariff as to leave the consumer price of the taxed good unchanged strictly reduces national 
welfare. 
 
Proof: Since dq = 0 requires that dX = -dX
*, equation (5) in this case becomes 
 
* d ( )d (d d ). Wq c t X Xt τ τ =− − − + +       ( 1 2 )  
From equation (3), dX = -dX
* requires that -dτ = 2dt. Then, d  = (1/ )d  < 0 Xq t ′  and 
d  + d   =  -d   <  0; tt τ  thus both terms in (12) are strictly negative. QED 
 
The underlying reasoning is of course closely related to that given for Proposition 1 above. 
In order to hold the consumer price constant, as Proposition 2 requires, it is necessary to 
increase imports by more than does the point-for-point reform of Proposition 1. This 
amplifies the adverse impact on domestic profits; it also means that government revenue is 
sure to rise in this case,
7 but again not by enough to offset the effect on welfare of the adverse 
rent-shifting. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Recent work has established an appealingly simple strategy for realizing the efficiency gains 
from trade liberalization whilst at the same time increasing government revenue: simply 
offset tariff cuts point-for-point with increased destination-based consumption taxes. Few 
propositions from the theory of piecemeal reform in the presence of a binding revenue 
constraint are so readily applicable. The examples presented in this note have shown very   - 8 - 
 
starkly, however, that caution is warranted in applying this strategy if firms are price setters 
in the international market. In such circumstances this reform can quite plausibly lower 
welfare rather than increase it. This is not to say, of course, that there are no circumstances in 
which such a coordinated tax-tariff reform will increase welfare even in the presence of 
imperfect competition.  We leave to future work, however, the characterization of preference 
and market structures that are conducive to such an outcome. 
 
References 
Brander, James A. and Barbara J. Spencer, “Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition,” in 
Monopolistic Competition and International Trade ed. by Henryk Kierzkowksi, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984. 
Dixit, Avinash, “International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries,” Economic Journal 
(Supplement) 94 (1984):1-16. 
Ebrill, Liam, Janet Stotsky and Reint Gropp, Revenue Implications of Trade Liberalization, 
IMF Occasional Paper No. 180, Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1999. 
Falvey, Rod, “Revenue Enhancing Tariff Reform,” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 130 
(1994):175-89. 
Hatzipanayotou, Panos, Michael S. Michael and Stephen M. Miller, “Win-Win Indirect Tax 
Reform: A Modest Proposal,” Economics Letters 44 (1994):147-51. 
Havrylyshyn, Oli and Engin Civan, “Intra-Industry Trade Among Developing Countries,” 
Journal of Development Economics 18 (1985):253-71. 
Keen, Michael and Jenny E. Ligthart, “Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tariff 
Reform,” Journal of International Economics 56 (2002):489-507.   - 9 - 
 
Keen, Michael and Sajal Lahiri, “Domestic Tax Reform and International Oligopoly,” 
Journal of Public Economics 51 (1993):55-74.  
Michael, Michael S., Panos Hatzipanayotou and Stephen M. Miller, “Integrated Reforms of 
Tariffs and Consumption Taxes,” Journal of Public Economics 52 (1993):417-28. 
Tanzi, Vito, “Impact of Macroeconomic Policies on the Level of Taxation and the Fiscal 
Balance in Developing Countries,” IMF Staff Papers 36 (1989):633-56.  
Tharakan, P.K. Mathew, “Intra-Industry Trade between the Industrial Countries and the 
Developing World,” European Economic Review 26 (1984):213-27. 
Tsuneki, Atsushi, “Pareto-Improving Changes of Tariffs and Taxes,” Public Finance 50 
(1995):470-77. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   - 10 - 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1 See Tanzi (1989) and Ebrill et al. (1999) for an overview of the revenue implications of 
trade liberalization. 
2 A radial contraction of tariffs accompanied by an exactly offsetting increase in consumption 
taxes—as studied by Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994)—is a special case of Keen and Ligthart’s 
more general proposition. 
3 Both Tharakan (1984) and Havrylyshyn and Civan (1985), for instance, show that intra-
industry trade between developing and industrial countries is far from negligible. 
4 The assumption that taxes and tariffs are levied in specific rather than—as is the usual 
practice—in ad valorem form is inessential to the point at issue. 
5 Both assumed to be untaxed. 
 
6 This follows on substitutingd  =   ( 2 / 3) d   X qt ′ and
* d   =  - ( 1 / 3 ) d   X qt ′ into 
* d( d d ) q=q X X ′ + . 
 
7 It is readily shown that in this case d /d 2 / 0. Gt q τ ′ = −>  

Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tariff Reform,”

Impact of Macroeconomic Policies on the Level of Taxation and the Fiscal Balance in Developing Countries,”

Integrated Reforms of Tariffs and Consumption Taxes,”

International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries,”

Intra-Industry Trade Among Developing Countries,”

Intra-Industry Trade between the Industrial Countries and the Developing World,”

Janet Stotsky and Reint Gropp, Revenue Implications of Trade Liberalization,

Pareto-Improving Changes of Tariffs and

Revenue Enhancing Tariff Reform,”

Win-Win Indirect Tax Reform:

Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition

Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

Research Papers in Economics