The main goal of this dissertation is to develop an overarching defense of Kant\u27s idea of the highest good, against the criticisms pointed out in the English-speaking world, within the framework of the so-called Beck-Silber controversy.
As it is known, since the second half of the last century, when the Beck-Silber controversy started, Kant\u27s idea of the highest good has been subject to a massive attack. These attacks motivated, in turn, the emergence of a counterforce of defenders, a group that I attempt to join through this work. Particularly, I have identified six criticisms against Kant\u27s idea of the highest good, which I have labeled as the problems of heteronomy, unsuitability, impossibility, injustice, irrelevance, and abandonment. Thanks to this, we know what a complete defense of Kant\u27s idea of the highest good requires. Now, once with all these criticisms identified, I develop a response to each of them. In that way, I show how Kant\u27s idea of the highest good does not undermines the principle of autonomy; how the highest good has not only a place, but a privileged one in his moral philosophy; how it is possible to promote a world in which happiness is distributed in accordance to virtue; how the problem of injustice is both ungrounded and overestimated; how the highest good is actually relevant for morality; and finally, that Kant did not abandoned his idea of the highest good at the end of his life. In this way, I hope having saved the highest good as part of Kant\u27s ethics
