El modelo HRV para expansión óptima de redes de transmisión: una aplicación a la red eléctrica de Ontario

Abstract

This paper presents an application of a mechanism that provides incentives to promote transmission network expansion in the electricity system of the Ontario province. Such a mechanism combines a merchant approach with a regulatory approach. It is based on the rebalancing of a two-part tariff within the framework of a wholesale electricity market with nodal pricing. The expansion of the network is carried out through auctions of financial transmission rights for congested links. The mechanism is tested for a simplified transmission grid with ten interconnected zones, ten nodes, eleven lines and seventy eight generators in the Ontario province. The simulation is carried out for both peak and non-peak scenarios. Considering Laspeyres weights, the results show that that prices converge to the marginal cost of generation, the congestion rent decreases, and the total social welfare increases