In recent years consumers, NGOs, and governments alike have become increasingly concerned about
the problem of `conflict¿ or `blood¿ diamonds in relation to on-going armed conflicts in Angola, Sierra
Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Allegations by NGOs, governments and the
UN that many conflicts are fuelled by illicit exports of diamonds have begun to be acknowledged by
the diamond industry. Diamonds, and the money they generate, have been used to purchase arms,
ammunition, uniforms and other equipment, as well as to pay soldiers and to cultivate strategic
alliances for those armed groups in control of territory rich in this lucrative resource. This has
facilitated the intensification and protraction of violent conflicts in Africa. Additionally, the wealth to
be gained from the illicit extraction and sale of diamonds has contributed to the prominence of
economic agendas in many civil wars that motivate faction leaders to continue the conflict in order to
protect their businesses.1 For example, the Angolan rebel group UNITA (União Nacional para a
Inedepência Total de Angola) is believed to have received US$3.7 billion in a six year period during
the 1990s - a far greater amount than the foreign aid received from patrons like the United States and
South Africa during the Cold War. This money has both funded large scale arms purchases and
swelled the personal coffers of UNITA leaders, thereby contributing to the intransigence of those
leaders in agreeing and implementing peace and facilitating continued violence.2 In Sierra Leone the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has funded its arms acquisitions with illicit diamond revenues and
the extraction of diamonds is seen as one of the main factors behind the lack of implementation of the
Lomé peace accord and the subsequent resurgence of violence. In the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) both the government and rebel forces have financed their war efforts through the
diamond trade, as have some of the intervening regional powers. As a result the fighting around
diamond rich areas and trading centres has been particularly intense. For example, in spite of a
unilateral ceasefire declared by Rwanda on the 29th of May 1999, it is believed to have sent 7,000
fresh troops to the DRC in June as the battle for the diamond rich area of Mbuji-Mayi escalated.
However the prominence of `conflict diamonds¿ in the policy discourse related to these conflicts and
their resolution has served to obscure a range of other issues which are equally, if not more, central to
finding lasting solutions to these wars. In spite of the fact that the arms flows which sustain these
conflicts are only partly financed by `conflict diamonds¿ they are often only mentioned as one aspect
of the illegal diamond trade rather than as a core issue. Even more concerning, perhaps, is that the
discourse of `greed¿ rather than `grievance¿ as the foundation and driving force of conflicts obscures
the complexity of political, social, and other economic dimensions of these wars. Thus, while efforts to
reduce the conflict diamond trade may be an essential element of the resolution of these conflicts,
other factors of potentially greater import are pushed down the agendas of many of the governments
and NGOs whose input into those processes may be the key to success. In short, therefore, the issue
2
of conflict diamonds is one aspect of the complex dynamics and processes of ongoing African
conflicts, not vice-versa
