This dissertation introduces "Truly Non-Cooperative Games" – axioms and complimentary negotiation models developed to analyse the human "Struggle for Life" – and presents "The Principle of Relative Insularity", a unified theory of value which unites economics, astrophysics, and biology. In brief, we discover that, reductio ad absurdum, value is a derivative function of relative insularity.non-cooperative games; theory of value; economic development strategy; systemic risks; global threat mitigation; national security; the problem of induction; relative insularity; international cooperation; human survival

Funk, Matt

English

Research Papers in Economics

TRULY NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES:  A UNFIED THEORY
Fig. 1. – A Conversation with  Willard Boyle (1)$
MATT FUNK, FLS£
18 May 2010
A DISSERTATION
Presented to the Faculty of The University of Malta,
in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
$ [A] Canadian... won a Nobel Prize Tuesday. But physicist Willard Boyle had to move to the U.S. to do his cutting-edge work.  
     Dr Boyle... warned that managers need to give scientists leeway to come up with the kinds of transformative inventions that are too often 
stifled by paperwork and red tape.  
     What scientists face today is 'almost disgraceful.  Do you think... George Smith and I ever wrote a business plan [or “ethics review board” 
requests, or wasted time slaving over academic journal formalisms]?...  You don't have time to do that kind of baloney.'
     Early in his career, Dr Boyle got a job at Bell Laboratories, a private research lab in New Jersey where he was given free rein to pursue his 
interests.  He and Dr Smith, who is American, came up with their invention while sketching possibilities on a blackboard in October, 1969.
     'There was something about that institution,' Dr Boyle told The Chronicle-Herald in Halifax...
     'I guess it was the management and the style and the general environment of the place....'
     Dr Boyle... said policy-makers should look at the practices of think tanks that produce Nobel Prize-winners..., instead of 'pouring money 
randomly into [things], expecting the same results.'
     'Usually... management people or... politicians haven't got the foggiest idea of what science is all about.'  What is needed is 'an appreciation for 
the free will, free spirit of scientists.  Give them a chance to do the things they want to do' (2 ; cf  3 ; §3).
£ The writer's object in putting forward his views in the present imperfect manner is to submit them to the test of other minds, and to be made 
aware of all the facts supposed to be inconsistent with them.  As his hypothesis is one which claims acceptance solely as explaining and connecting 
facts which exist in nature, he expects facts alone to be brought to disprove it; not à-priori arguments against its probability (4).ABSTRACT
This dissertation introduces Truly Non-cooperative Games – 
axioms and complimentary negotiation models developed to 
analyse the human Struggle for Life (cf 5-11) – and presents 
The Principle of Relative Insularity, a unified theory of value 
which unites economics, astrophysics, and biology.  In brief, 
we discover that, reductio ad absurdum, value is a derivative 
function of relative insularity:  V=f´(IR).$
§1.  PROBLEM SITUATION£
It appears Aristotle may have been amongst the first to search 
for a theory of value (14), and this quest has kept true 
problem-solvers awake at night ever since: 
In economics the most fundamental of these central 
problems is the theory of value.  The theory of value 
must explain how the comparative values of different 
goods   and   services   are   established.    Until   that 
problem is solved, it is not possible to analyse for 
scientific purposes what will be produced and in 
what quantities, how the resources will be employed 
in producing the menu of outputs, and how the 
resources will be valued (15).
And thus it remains impossible to analyse a myriad of related 
problems, including sustainable economic development, 
global warming, warfighting, asteroids, supervolcanoes, 
reserve currencies, and value at risk (VaR).  Indeed, 
“insufficient consideration of [these] circumstances lie at the 
root of  [our present] difficulties” (16).
$ Value is the essence of things in economics.  Its laws are to political 
economy what the law of gravity is to mechanics.  Every great system 
of political economy up till now has formulated its own peculiar view 
on value as the ultimate foundation in theory of its applications to 
practical life, and no new effort at reform can have laid an adequate 
foundation for these applications if it cannot support them on a new 
and more perfect theory of value (12).
£ When we propose a theory... we also propose, or try to understand, 
its logical implications; that is, all those statements which follow from 
it.  But this… is a hopeless task: there is an infinity of unforeseeable 
nontrivial statements belonging to the informative content of any 
theory, and an exactly corresponding infinity of statements belonging 
to its logical content.  We can therefore never know or understand all 
the implications of any theory, or its full significance.
     ...Understanding a theory is always an infinite task, and... theories 
can in principle be understood better and better.  ...If we wish to 
understand a theory better, what we have to do first is to discover its 
logical relation to those existing problems and existing theories which 
constitute what we may call the 'problem situation'.
     Admittedly, we also try to look ahead:  we try to discover new 
problems raised by our theory.  But the task is infinite, and can never 
be completed (13).
§2.  HYPOTHESIS
Nash developed fruitful equilibrium points (17 ; cf 18) and 
non-cooperative games (19), emphasizing the existence of
situations in economics or international politics in 
which, effectively, a group of interests are involved in 
a non-cooperative game without being aware of it; 
the non-awareness [making] the situation truly non-
cooperative (19).
Our theory (20-24), in contradistinction, highlights the truly 
non-cooperative nature of every situation in the universe.  Thus 
our realistic, asymmetric games (25) share attributes with 
games against nature (26) and games with incomplete 
information (27).
But   as   the   exposition   of   the   entire   group   of 
considerations would be rather difficult to follow, 
only a few quite elementary  reflexions  will be 
given..., from which the reader will readily be able 
to inform himself [i.e., 20-24] as to the suppositions 
of the theory and its line of thought (28).
Two players, Relatively Insular States (RIS) and Globalized 
Economic Military Superpowers (GEMS) fight for survival (cf 5-
11); axioms (20-21) inform strategy:  RIS = Maximum 
Ecological Protection, GEMS = Maximum Economic Development. 
Equilibrium is attained when players pursue rational, 
opposing Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) (22) by 
employing The Principle of Relative Insularity.  Strategic 
equilibrium yields rational, mutually beneficial behaviour, 
maximum planetary insularity, and thus maximizes value 
(22).  Furthermore, strategic transparency facilitates rational 
play:  If all players recognize the value of respective, opposing 
– yet inherently complimentary and, perhaps ironically, ultimately 
cooperative – strategies, then all players act, communicate, 
negotiate, and cooperate more rationally, peacefully, and thus 
economic development is optimized and human survival 
prospects are maximized (22).
     Alas, “nothing seems less wanted than a simple solution to 
an age-old... problem” (30); thus we shall emphasize and 
contextualize:  Ulam once challenged Samuelson to name a 
social theory which was nontrivial and true; Samuelson 
countered with Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage:
That it is logically true need not be argued before a 
mathematician; that is not trivial is attested by the 
thousands of ... men who have never been able to 
grasp the doctrine for themselves or to believe it 
after it was explained to them (31).
As a sailor who has encountered countless intelligent 
islanders unable to grasp this doctrine (22), I'm inclined to 
1agree, but a stronger rebuttal to Ulam's challenge, On the 
Origin of Mass Extinctions: Darwin's Nontrivial Error (24), 
requires our immediate attention.
     Furthermore, the “denaturalization of economics” (32), 
logic of war (33), true nature economic power (34), Hardin's 
error (35-36), and Popper's solution to Hume's problem of 
induction (37-38) require patient and careful consideration as 
well.  Indeed, these nontrivial truths (32-38) may help us 
grasp why our in-communicative (39) and thus truly 
uncooperative “prisoners” (40) – the unknown and unknowable 
future (21) – beg us to reconsider fashionable (but false) 
theories, plead for international cooperation (24), and 
implore us to consider a revolutionary approach to science.$
     Which brings us to our final reflexion:
In 1452 in Mainz, Germany, a goldsmith named 
Johannes Gutenberg put ink to movable type and.... 
Gutenberg’s invention was a piece of technology that 
made printing... simple and inexpensive.  His first 
[book] was a bible.  Venture capitalists, if there were 
such a thing in fifteenth-century Germany, might 
have looked at Gutenberg’s... invention and seen a 
way to make cheaper bibles.  'Let’s pour some money 
into Gutenberg’s printing press and in a few years we 
can take over the whole Bible business,' they might... 
have concluded.  If they had done so, however, they 
would have missed the entire point...  The printing 
press   was   not   about   cheaper   bibles,  it   was   a 
technological revolution that made it possible for 
anyone with an idea to publish anything.  [It] changed 
our world.  It led to an explosion of knowledge, of 
learning,  of   ideas.    It   brought   down   Medieval 
Europe..., crushed the Power of Kings, and gave rise 
to the middle class, manufacturing, and trade.  It set 
off the Enlightenment and created... the world we 
inhabit   today.    We   are,   in   effect,   the   direct 
descendents of the Gutenberg Revolution.  The US 
Constitution is a written, printed document.   It 
enumerates our rights and how our country is 
supposed to work.  Yet the very first Amendment..., 
the very core of the Bill of Rights does not say 'You 
have the right to vote' or 'You have the right to be 
free.'  Instead, it says, 'Congress Shall Make No Law 
Abridging a Free Press.'   That is because [our] 
Founding Fathers... understood that the primary 
bulwark of a free society is a free press (43).
$ One can argue that all environments are hostile, and that death and 
extinction are probable events, while survival is improbable....  In my 
opinion, this problem may well be used as the framework on which to 
build the teaching of [science] (41 ; cf 42).
The internet represents a technological advance of equal 
wonder.  It has spawned revolutions of equal significance. 
Indeed, this world-wide-web has linked and liberated true 
problem-solvers (44), thereby helping to deliver (i.e., 20-24 ; 
34-35) this revolutionary theory of value to you:  V=f´(IR).£
§3.  A NOTE ON METHOD
Fellow sailor George Smith was recently commended for his 
3-page PhD thesis (46); this compliment intrigued me.  
     But profound truths (2) uttered by another sailor (and 
fighter pilot) intrigued me even more; in fact, they inspired 
me to chart a course for Halifax, because the non-existence 
of scientific method (2 ; 10 ; 13 ; 30 ; 32 ; 36-38 ; 44-48) is 
yet another nontrivial affair; although we did indeed discuss 
this difficult and illusive truth at great length (1) , I'll merely 
relate one inspirational remark:
It's  always  a   bad   sign  when  people   come   into 
meetings with stacks under their arms and start 
handing you piles to read.  I hired Smith because he 
was able to communicate something very complex 
and very important in just three pages (1).
Since economics was created to promote national interests 
(49), it comes of no surprise that most real problems (2 ; 4-7 
; 11 ; 16 ; 20-24 ; 28 ; 30 ; 32-38 ; 41-42 ; 44-48 ; 50-52) 
remain outside the non-existent subject of economics (47), 
and thus “economics” remains unable to analyze and inform 
strategy regarding mission-critical global threats.  And that's 
exactly why we're not really playing games here, afterall.†
£ Internet publishing reduces the stifling impact of the refereeing 
process on the papers accepted and submitted to journals.  ...Scholars 
are less bound to devote a large part of their time and effort on 
formalisms.  They have more leeway to concentrate on matters of 
content....   The dominance of orthodoxy is reduced (45).
† What Mises taught us in his writings, ...lectures, [and] seminars, was 
that economics... is primordially, crucially important.  Economics is 
not an intellectual game.  Economics is deadly serious.  The very 
future of mankind... depends... upon widespread understanding of... 
the principles of economics.
    This is a lesson which is located almost entirely outside economics 
proper.  But all Mises’ work depended ultimately upon this tenet. 
Almost invariably, a scientist is motivated by values not strictly part of 
the science itself.  The lust for fame, for material rewards—even the 
pure love of truth—these goals may possibly be fulfilled by scientific 
success, but are themselves not... worthwhile goals.   What drove 
Mises, what accounted for his passionate dedication, his ability to 
calmly ignore the sneers of, and the isolation imposed by academic 
contemporaries, was his conviction that the survival of mankind 
depends on the development and dissemination of... economics….
     Economics is not simply a matter of intellectual problem solving, 
like a challenging crossword puzzle, but literally a matter of the life 
or death of the human race (50).
299.99% of all species that have inhabited the Earth 
are extinct; the average species lifespan is 2 Myr. 
How do we communicate the implications which 
follow from these truths?  How many will grasp that 
sound  global  threat mitigation  strategies require 
unprecedented,   largely   redirected   international 
cooperation?   'Studies of mass extinctions tend to 
emphasize the sheer scope of the carnage.  But the 
subtle differences between the species that died and 
those that survived can be crucial' [51] (24).$
Villa Rosa, Malta, Easter Monday, 2010
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