Within-Season Rents: Maximised or Dissipated in an Open-Access Fishery?

Abstract

Abstract It is pervasively argued that the equilibrium outcome for an open-access fishery in which harvesting cost is inversely related to fish stock is inefficient, with complete dissipation of within-season rents. However, some argue instead that within-season rents are maximised. Conditions under which either outcome can be justified are considered. Competitive open-access outcomes are presented for different versions of continuous-time and discrete-time models of within-season fishing. The general conclusion is that in many cases rent maximisation is the more plausible outcome. The issue is important for determining the benefits of different types of regulation under uncertainty, the optimal settings of instruments such as quotas and landing fees, and the way in which open-access outcomes should be modelled in applied work.Open-access fishery, within-season rent, non-cooperative game., Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, D62, Q22,