It is shown that altruism does not affect the equilibrium provision of public goods although altruism takes the form of unconditional commitment to contribute. The reason is that altruistic contributions completely crowd out selfish contributions. That is, egoists free ride on altruism. It is also shown that public goods are less likely to be provided in larger groups.Free Riding, Public good, Altruism

Jean Hindriks

Romans Pancs

English

Research Papers in Economics

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Free Riding on Altruism and Group Size

http://www.econ.qmul.ac.uk/papers/doc/wp436.pdf

Free Riding on Altruism and Group Size

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