In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with general agreement rules. For n-player games where in each period a player is randomly selected to allocate a stochastic level of surplus and qNONCOOPERATIVE BARGAINING; VOTING RULES; STOCHASTIC GAMES

Eraslan, H.

Merlo, A.

English

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Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining

http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9188/RR00-05.PDF

Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining

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