Streik, Arbeitskonflikt, Arbeitsrecht, EU-Staaten, Strike, Labour dispute, Labour law, EU countries

Markus Selwitschka

Wolfgang Ochel

English

Research Papers in Economics

CESifo DICE Report 2/2003 63
Database
LABOUR DISPUTE RULES
AND STRIKES IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
WOLFGANG OCHEL AND
MARKUS SELWITSCHKA
Declining volume of labour disputes
From time to time, the media give the impression
of a European economy plagued by labour dis-
putes. But this picture is misleading. Europe
enjoys a high level of industrial peace which has
increased over the last thirty years. Nevertheless,
there is a considerable difference between the
various countries of the European Union in this
respect, as can be seen from the statistics on
labour disputes published by the International
Labour Office (ILO).
As a rule, three indicators are used to describe the
severity of a labour dispute: participation, duration
and volume. The participation relates the employ-
ees taking part in the labour dispute to the number
of labour disputes. Within the period from 1971 to
2000, in the twelve EU countries (excluding
Germany, France and Luxembourg due to lack of
data) on average a good 1000 employees were
involved in each labour dispute, with the numbers
ranging from 264 in Finland to 3271 in Austria.
Neither a rise nor a decline in strike participation
could be observed (Lesch 2002).
However, the duration of strikes
declined in all these countries
(with the exception of Finland).
Thus 14 working days were lost
per strike in Ireland during the
nineteen seventies for each
employee involved, whereas this
had dropped to only six days in
the nineties. In Germany, the
duration of strikes declined
from 6.3 days to 1.6 days and in
Great Britain from 8.5 days to
2.7 days (Fig. 1).
But the most significant parame-
ter was the decline in the volume
of labour disputes. This factor
designates the number of working days lost
referred to the number of dependent employees.
The volume of labour disputes has declined con-
siderably in the last 30 years in all EU member
states.This trend is illustrated by Fig.2,which com-
pares the number of working days lost in the
nineties with those lost during the period
1971/2000.
There is, nevertheless, a considerable gradient
within the European Union. Labour disputes are
particularly disruptive in Spain, Greece and Italy,
but also in Finland and Ireland, even if the number
of working days lost due to strikes has greatly
declined, especially in Italy.Among the economies
relatively free of strikes are Austria, Germany and
the Netherlands. Thus in Germany only 11 work
days were lost due to strikes for every 1000
employees in the nineties. On the basis of a daily
working time of 7.40 hours, this corresponds to
about 5 minutes per year and employee.
Reasons for the decline in volume of
labour disputes 
Macroeconomic reasons, changes in the manufac-
turing conditions of companies and politico-insti-
tutional factors are responsible for the decline in
the volume of labour disputes. The most salient of
the macroeconomic reasons is the structural
change in the economy. In most EU countries,
labour disputes are still concentrated in the manu-
facturing sector, whereas the service sector
remains largely free from them (Davies 2001).This
shows that work days lost due to labour disputes
Figure 1are declining as the economy becomes increasingly
dominated by the tertiary sector. Beyond this,
lower inflation in the EU appears to have led to
fewer strikes. If the expected inflation rate
declines, the wage demands of the unions, which
aim to safeguard real incomes, also decline. The
uncertainty with respect to the expected inflation
rate declines and the conflict potential between
unions and employers is consequently reduced.
(There appears to be no unequivocal relationship
between the level of unemployment and the vol-
ume of labour disputes.)
In addition to these macroeconomic factors,
changes in manufacturing conditions have also
reduced the volume of labour disputes.The reduc-
tion of vertical integration by outsourcing and the
limitation of inventories by just-in-time production
have increased the susceptibility of the production
process to disruption. Pinpointed strikes today
allow the same effects to be achieved as those
which previously required mass strikes.This is like-
ly to have made employers more willing to make
concessions and avoid strikes.
Finally, the lower level of union organization, which
depletes strike funds and weakens the potential for
mobilization, has also contributed to the decline in
the volume of labour disputes. As can be seen from
Table 1, the degree of union organization in
Germany,France,Greece,Great Britain,Ireland,the
Netherlands, Austria and Portugal has declined. In
the other countries it has remained constant or has
risen. However, the increase in the degree of union
organization in Belgium, Denmark, Finland and
Sweden cannot necessarily lead
us to conclude a greater belliger-
ence on the part of the employees.
In these countries, membership
of the unions is already worth-
while because they provide volun-
tary unemployment assurance
(generously subsidized by the
state) (Boeri, Brugiavini, Calm-
fors 2001, p. 172).
Labour dispute rules and
national frequency
of strikes
In order to explain the differ-
ences in the volume of labour
disputes between different countries, apart from
the national peculiarities relating to the parame-
ters already mentioned, the rules on labour dis-
putes, which vary from country to country, must
also be brought into the picture. One set of these
rules must be observed when initiating a labour
dispute. This includes the obligation to maintain
industrial peace which prohibits the partners to the
collective bargaining agreements from initiating
labour disputes during the term of such agree-
ments, the arbitration procedures which must be
followed before a labour dispute breaks out, and
the stipulation to conduct a ballot prior to a walk-
out. Secondly, the rules on labour dispute restrict
the legality of both strikes and lock-outs.The oblig-
ation to maintain industrial peace, arbitration pro-
cedures (with the exception of mandatory state
arbitration, which usually comes into force too
late), ballots and the restriction of the range of
CESifo DICE Report 2/2003 64
Database
Figure 2
Table 1
Level of union organization
a) in %
1970 1980 1990 1998
Austria 57 52 47 39
Belgium 42 53 50 54
b)
Denmark 63 78 75 76
Finland 51 69 73 79
France 20 22 14 10
Germany 32 35 32 26
Great Britain 45 51 38 30
Greece n. a. 36 34 24
b)
Ireland 53 57 53 42
Italy 37 50 39 38
Netherlands 37 35 24 23
Portugal n. a. 52 40 30
b)
Spain n. a. 8 11 16
Sweden 67 78 82 88
a) Without pensioners. – 
b) 1995.
Source: Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000).CESifo DICE Report 2/2003 65
Database
legal strikes have an equally debilitating effect on
strikes as the legalization of lock-outs.
It can be seen from Tables 2 and 3 that the EU
countries follow a varied mix of rules relating to
labour disputes. With the exception of France and
Greece, the obligation to maintain industrial peace
is part of the legal order of all EU countries.
Arbitration procedures in collective-bargaining
conflicts are also usual in all member states.
However, state arbitration agencies come into play
to a varied degree. State efforts at arbitration
which are mandatory on the collective-bargaining
partners are found in Denmark, Portugal and
Spain. In some countries, ballots must precede
labour disputes. The range of legal strikes is con-
strained in various ways by the national legislators.
Various forms of strike activity are available to
employees in Belgium, Finland, France, Greece,
Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. In most of these
countries, employers can protect themselves with
the aid of lock-outs.
If we arrange countries according to whether they
favour strike-reducing or strike-promoting rules
on labour disputes, we find the following groups.
Strike-reducing rules are applied in Austria,
Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and
Great Britain. Four of these countries showed the
lowest number of days of work lost due to strikes
per 1000 employees in the nineties. Only in Ireland
and Denmark did this set of rules not reduce the
volume of labour disputes. In contrast, strike-pro-
moting rules tend to be applied in Belgium,France,
Greece, Portugal and Spain. Greece and Spain suf-
fered many strikes in the nineties, whereas the
other countries showed a lower volume of labour
disputes. On the whole a certain correlation seems
Table 2
Pre-strike regulations
Peace
Obligation
Arbitration Strike
Ballot
Austria Yes Public arbitration is possible.
a) No
Belgium Yes Arbitration is possible but an exception.
a) No
Denmark Yes At failure of the collective agreement public arbitration,
constraining.
b) Yes
Finland Yes Binding participation at public arbitration.
c) No
France No
d) Voluntary participation at public arbitration; very rare.
a) Possible
e)
Germany Yes Voluntary participation at public arbitration.
a) Yes
Greece No
f) At failure of the collective agreement; public arbitration is
voluntary.
g) No
Ireland Yes
h) Voluntary participation at public arbitration.
i) Yes
Italy Yes
j) Voluntary participation at public arbitration.
a) No
Luxembourg Yes Constraining participation at public arbitration.
k) No
Netherlands Yes In the private sector no formal arbitration system exists
a);
constraining participation at public arbitration at the public sector. Yes
Portugal Restricted
l) At failure of the collective agreement voluntary conflict resolution;
if failing public arbitration, constraining.
b) No
Spain Yes At failure of the collective agreement public arbitration,
constraining.
b) Possible
m)
Sweden Yes
n) Facultative public arbitration. No
o)
United
Kingdom Possible Facultative arbitration.
p) Yes
a) Predominantly voluntary conflict resolution by the parties of the collective agreement. – 
b) Decisions are final and
cannot normally be overturned. – 
c) Decisions are optional. – 
d) Strikes are lawful during the lifetime of agreements.
– 
e) At the discretion of the unions. – 
f) Greek law contains no provisions relating to peace obligation. – 
g) Decisions
have the same standing in law as a collective agreement. – 
h) By several social agreements. – 
i) By the Labour
Relations Commission. – 
j) Obligation placed on workers’ organizations that have signed a collective agreement to
refrain from calling strikes. – 
k) Awards are not binding but generally accepted. – 
l) Does apply to the parties of the
collective agreement but not to the individual employee. – 
m) It is not obligatory by law but it has become
widespread practice in the Spanish industrial relations system. – 
n) Solidarity strikes are possible. – 
o) In many cases
there are now council conventions in single unions. – 
p) By the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service.
Sources: EMIRE, Database of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions;
European Commission (1998 and 2000).– at first sight – to exist between the forms of the
rules relating to labour disputes and the volume of
these disputes. It is, however, rather weak.
References
Boeri, T., A. Brugiavini and L. Calmfors (eds.) (2001), The Role of
Unions in the Twenty-First Century, Oxford.
Davies,J.(2001),“International Comparisons of Labour Disputes in
1999”, Labour Market Trends 109 (4), 195–201.
Ebbinghaus,B.and J.Visser (2000),Trade Unions in Western Europe
since 1945, London, New York.
Europäische Kommission (1998), Die Regelungen der Arbeitsbe-
dingungen in den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union,
Luxembourg.
Europäische Kommission (2000), Arbeitsbeziehungen in Europa
2000, Luxembourg.
Lesch, H. (2002), “Streik und Arbeitskampfregeln im interna-
tionalen Vergleich”, iw-trends 2, 5–17.
CESifo DICE Report 2/2003 66
Database
Table 3
Lawfulness of strikes and lock-outs
Strikes
Political Other
Lock-outs
Austria Unusual Only official strikes organized by trade unions; strikes are considered
as an uncommon instrument of conflict resolution.
Yes
Belgium Yes Various forms are legal. No
Denmark No Official strikes legal; protest strikes unlawful (but only small financial
penalty); selective strikes: common.
Yes
Finland Yes Various forms are legal. Yes
France Yes Various forms are legal (including unofficial strikes, selective strikes
etc.); rotating strikes prohibited in the public services.
Restrained
a)
Germany No A strike is lawful only if it is conducted by a trade union. Yes
b)
Greece Yesc) Various forms are legal. No
Ireland Unusual Organization by trade unions is not strictly necessary. Yes
Italy Yes Various forms are legal. Restrained
d)
Luxembourg n.a. Strikes without preliminary conciliation procedures are unlawful. No
e)
Netherlands Yes Official strikes organized by trade unions. Yes
f)
Portugal Yes Most strikes are perfectly lawful. No
Spain Yes
g) Various forms are legal (intermittent, sympathy, general); rotating
and wildcat strikes are unlawful.
Restrained
h)
Sweden Yes Various forms are legal. Yes
United
Kingdom No Official strikes in accordance with the rules of a trade union. Yes
a) As a general principle, lock-outs are deemed to be unlawful; but courts allow lock-outs in the case of “compelling
circumstances” (in the event of a strike which is unlawful; improper use of the right to strike); defensive lock-outs
are prohibited. – 
b)  Offensive lock-outs are unlawful. – 
c) If it relates to employment – related demands. – 
d) Defen--
sive lock-outs may be legal under certain conditions. – 
e) Lock-outs without preliminary conciliation procedures are
unlawful. – 
f) No lock-outs since 1945. – 
g) Politico-industrial strikes under certain conditions. – 
h) Only when persons
or property are in danger.
Source: EMIRE, Database of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions;
European Commission (1998).

Labour Dispute Rules and Strikes in the European Union

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Labour Dispute Rules and Strikes in the European Union

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