Peter Boone and Simon Johnson believe that the next financial crisis could lead to economic disaster

Peter Boone

Simon Johnson

English

Research Papers in Economics

CentrePiece Winter 2009/10
2
O
ver the last three
decades, the US financial
system has tripled in size,
as measured by total
credit relative to GDP 
(see Figure 1). Each time the system runs
into problems, the Federal Reserve quickly
lowers interest rates to revive it. These
crises appear to be getting worse and
worse – and their impact is increasingly
global. Not only are interest rates near
zero around the world, but many
countries are on fiscal trajectories that
require major changes to avoid eventual
financial collapse.
What will happen when the next
shock hits? We believe we may be 
nearing the stage where the answer will
be – just as it was in the Great Depression
– a calamitous global collapse. The root
Over the last 30 years, we have built a financial
system that threatens to topple our global
economic order unless decisive measures are
taken.That is the contention of Peter Boone and
Simon Johnson, who describe a ‘doomsday cycle’
that could lead to economic disaster after the
next financial crisis.
The doomsday cycle
0
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
350%
400%
Savings & loans crisis
LTCM bailout
Tech bubble Subprime 
bubble
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0
1997 1995 1993 1991 1989 1987 1985 1983 1981
Figure 1:
Private sector credit/GDP just keeps growing, while 
the Fed funds target rate is now near to zero
Source: Bloomberg, US Department of Commerce
F
e
d
 
f
u
n
d
s
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
 
r
a
t
e
 
R
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
 
t
o
 
G
D
PCentrePiece Winter 2009/10
3
problem is that we have let a ‘doomsday
cycle’ infiltrate our economic system (see
Figure 2).
1
The doomsday cycle has several simple
stages. At the start, creditors and
depositors provide banks with cheap
funding in the expectation that if things
go very wrong, our central banks and
fiscal authorities will bail them out. Banks
such as Lehman Brothers – and many
others in this past cycle – use the funds to
take large risks, with the aim of providing
dividends and bonuses to shareholders
and management.
Through direct subsidies (such as
deposit insurance) and indirect support
(such as central bank bailouts), we
encourage our banking system to ignore
large, socially harmful ‘tail risks’ – those
risks where there is a small chance of
calamitous collapse. As far as banks are
concerned, they can walk away and let
the state clean it up. Some bankers and
policy-makers even do well during the
collapse that they helped to create. 
Regulators are supposed to prevent
this dangerous risk-taking. Adair Turner,
chairman of the Financial Services
Authority, is calling for more radical
change than most regulators. But banks
wield substantial political and financial
power, and the system has become
remarkably complex, so eventually
regulators become compromised.
The extent of regulatory failure ahead
of the current crisis was mind-boggling.
Many banks, including Northern Rock,
convinced regulators that they could hold
just 2% of capital against large and risky
asset portfolios. The whole banking
system built up many trillions of dollars in
exposures to derivatives. This meant that
when one large bank failed, it could bring
down the whole system. 
Given the inability of our political and
social systems to handle the hardship that
would follow economic collapse, we rely
on our central banks to cut interest rates
and direct credits to bail out the loss-
makers. While the faces tend to change,
each central bank and government
operates similarly. This time, it was Mervyn
King, Gordon Brown, Tim Geithner and
Ben Bernanke who oversaw policy as the
bubble was inflating – and are now
designing our rescue.
When the bailout is done, we start all
over again. This has been the pattern in
many developed countries since the mid-
1970s – a date that coincides with
significant macroeconomic and regulatory
1 Andrew Haldane, executive director for financial stability at the Bank of England,
has written an excellent paper describing a similar idea – the ‘doom loop’ 
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech409.pdf).
Too many 
loss making 
bets
Regulation is 
aimed to 
prevent excess 
Regulators 
captured 
by the 
industry
Losses happen  
– we bail out 
the system
Explicit and 
implict subsidies 
encourage 
excessive risk
Figure 2:
The doomsday cycle
Dick Fuld, 
Lehman Brothers
Adair Turner
Tim Geithner
Ben Bernanke
Alistair Darling
Larry Summers
Mervyn King
Jamie Dimon
Lloyd Blankfein
America's top ten bank CEOs
Stopping the
doomsday cycle
requires major
reform with
policies
implemented
across the G-20CentrePiece Winter 2009/10
4
change, including the end of the Bretton
Woods fixed exchange rate systems,
reduced capital controls in rich countries
and the beginning of 20 years of
regulatory easing.
The real danger is that as this cycle
continues, the scale of the problem is
getting bigger. If each cycle requires
greater and greater public intervention, 
we will surely eventually collapse.
Stopping the doomsday cycle
To stop the doomsday cycle, we need far
greater reform than is currently under
discussion. The headline-grabbing actions
of Gordon Brown and Alistair Darling,
calling for financial transactions taxes and
a one-year super tax on bonuses, have no
impact on the fundamental problems in
our system. Indeed, they are potentially
harmful to the extent that they mislead
taxpayers who want real solutions.
We need quite different and much
more focused policies. These policies must
be implemented across the G-20, with
international coordination and monitoring.
Otherwise, financial services will move to
the least regulated parts of the world, and
it will be much more difficult for each
country to maintain a tough stance.
The best route to
creating a safer
financial system is 
to have very large 
and robust capital
requirementsCentrePiece Winter 2009/10
5
Tackling regulatory failure
So what should be done? First, consider
the regulatory problem: there are two
broad ways to view past regulatory failure
that has helped us arrive at this dangerous
point. One is to argue it is a mistake that
can be corrected through better rules.
That has been the path of successive
Basel committees, which are now
designing comprehensive new rules to
ensure greater liquidity at banks and to
close past loopholes that permitted banks
to reduce their core capital. We both
worked for many years in formerly
communist countries, and this project
reminds us of central planners’ attempts
to rescue their systems with additional
regulations until it became all too
apparent that collapse was imminent. 
In our view, the long-term failure of
regulation to check financial collapses
reflects deep political difficulties in
creating regulation. The banks have the
money, they have the best lawyers and
they have the funds to finance the political
system. Politicians rarely want strong
regulators – except after a major collapse.
So politics rarely favours regulation.
There are also big operational
problems: how should regulators decide
the risk capital that should be allocated to
new and arcane derivatives, which banks
claim will reduce risk? When faced with
rooms full of papers describing new
instruments, and their risk assessments,
regulators will always be at a disadvantage
compared with banks.
The operational difficulties are further
complicated by the intellectual
undercurrents: when the economy is
booming, driven by more leveraged bets,
there is a tendency for the academic world
to provide theories that justify status quo
policies. This is clear from the growth of
efficient markets theories, which infiltrated
regulators’ decision-making during the
boom ahead of this crisis.
No wonder that Tim Geithner, while
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, or Alan Greenspan and Ben
Bernanke, as Fed chairman, did little to
arrest the rapid growth of derivatives and
off-balance sheet assets.
It requires a strong leap of faith to
believe that our regulatory system will
never again be captured or corrupted. The
fact that it has spectacularly failed to limit
costly risk should be no surprise. In our
view, the new regulations discussed in
Basel 3 will fail, just as Basel 1 and Basel 2
have failed.
The proposals sound smart because
they are correcting egregious errors of the
past. But new errors will surface over the
next five to ten years, and these will be
precisely where loopholes remain, and
where the system gradually becomes
corrupted, again.
We believe that the best route to
creating a safer system is to have very
large and robust capital requirements,
which are legislated and difficult to
circumvent or revise. If we triple core
capital at major banks to 15-25% of
assets, and err on the side of requiring too
much capital for derivatives and other
complicated financial structures, we will
create a much safer system with less scope
for ‘gaming’ the rules.
Once shareholders have a serious
amount of funds at risk, relative to the
winnings they would make from
gambling, they will be less likely to
gamble. This will make the job of
regulators far easier, and make it 
more likely our current regulatory system
could work.
Changing incentives
Second, we need to make the individuals
who are part of any failed system expect
large losses when their gambles fail and
public money is required to bail out the
system. While many executives at bailed-
out institutions lost large amounts of
money, they remain very wealthy.
Some people have clearly become
winners from the crisis. Alistair Darling
supported the appointment of Win
Bischoff, a top executive at Citigroup in
the run-up to its spectacular failure, to be
chairman of Lloyds. Vikram Pandit sold his
hedge fund to Citigroup, who then wrote
off most of the cost as a loss, but Pandit
was soon named their CEO.
Jamie Dimon and Lloyd Blankfein,
CEOs at JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs
respectively, are outright winners from this
process, despite the fact that each of their
banks also received federal bailouts.
Goldman Sachs was lucky to gain access
to the Fed’s ‘discount window’, so
averting potential collapse.
We must stop sending the message to
our bankers that they can win on the rise
and also survive the downside. This
requires legislation that recoups past
earnings and bonuses from employees of
banks that require bailouts.
The role of policy-makers
Third, we need our leading fiscal and
monetary policy-makers to admit their role
in generating this doomsday cycle through
successive bailouts. They need to develop
solutions so that their institutions can
credibly stop this cycle. The problem is
simple: most financial institutions today
have now proven too big to fail, as our
policy-makers have bailed them all out.
The rules need to change so that creditors
do not expect another bailout when the
next crisis happens.
There is some encouraging progress
with plans for ‘living wills’ and measures
to reduce the interdependency of financial
institutions. But the litmus test for this will
be when our leading policy-makers start
calling for the break-up of large financial
institutions and permanent crude limits on
their size relative to the economy in the
future.
Smaller institutions are naturally easier
It is hard to
believe that
regulatory
reform will
succeed this
time, when 
it has failed so
enormously –
and repeatedly
– in the pastto let fail, and this will make creditors
nervous when lending to them, so we can
have more confidence that creditors will
not lend to highly risky small institutions.
There are feasible ways of doing this: for
example, we could impose rising capital
requirements on large institutions over the
next five years, thus encouraging them to
develop orderly plans to break up and
shrink their banks. 
Prospects for effective
reform
So where are we going with our current
reforms? It is now obvious that risk-taking
at banks will soon be larger than ever.
Central banks and governments around
the world have proved (once again) that
they are willing to bail out banks at
enormous public cost when things go
wrong. Markets are now again providing
very cheap loans to banks, with the
comfort that the state will bail them out.
Today, Bank of America and the Royal
Bank of Scotland are each priced to have
just 0.5% annual risk of default above
their sovereigns during the next five years
in credit markets. This is a remarkably low
implied risk considering that both banks
were near to collapse just a few months
ago. Creditors are clearly very confident
that they will be bailed out again if
necessary. Indeed, they are more
comfortable lending to large risky banks
than to many successful corporations.
There is no doubt that the regulatory
environment is going to be tougher for
the next few years. But nothing has
changed to make us believe the regulatory
system will succeed this time, when it has
failed so enormously – and repeatedly – in
the recent past. To bring about the
dramatic change that is needed also
requires international cooperation and
consistency.
Many of our current policy-makers –
Ben Bernanke, Mervyn King, Alistair
Darling and Gordon Brown – are the same
ones that inflated the last bubble. So we
know with great confidence that they are
the types that will bail us out each time
things go wrong. They are all currently on
course for seeding our next rise and
collapse: cheap rates and credit, with large
moral hazard, are the initial stages of each
cycle. Very few of these people, apart
from Mervyn King, appear prepared to
recognise their past role in creating our
current problems and then to discuss
resolutely how to change it. 
The danger this system poses is clear,
as Figure 1 shows. With our financial
system now well-oiled to take on very
large risk once again, and to gamble
excessively, can we be sure that we can
continue this cycle of bailing out eventual
failures? At what point will the costs be so
large that both fiscal and monetary
policies are simply incapable of stopping
the collapse?
Last year, we came remarkably close to
collapse. Next time, it may be worse. The
threat of the doomsday cycle remains
strong and growing.
CentrePiece Winter 2009/10
6
Peter Boone is a research associate in CEP’s
globalisation programme and chairman of
Effective Intervention (http://www.effint.org),
a charity based in Britain. He is also a
principal at Salute Capital Management.
Simon Johnson is a professor at MIT's Sloan
School of Management, a senior fellow at the
Peterson Institute for International
Economics and a member of the
Congressional Budget Office's Panel of
Economic Advisers.
They are co-founders of The Baseline
Scenario, a leading economics blog
(http://baselinescenario.com), and co-authors
of ‘Our Next Financial Crisis’, published in
The New Republic in September 2009
(http://www.tnr.com/article/economy/
the-next-financial-crisis).
The failure of
regulation to
check financial
collapses
reflects deep
political and
operational
difficulties in
creating
regulation
The rules need
to change so 
that creditors do
not expect
another bailout
when the next
crisis happens

The Doomsday Cycle

http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cp300.pdf

The Doomsday Cycle

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

Research Papers in Economics