This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition-proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games

and in games with positive externalities and binary actions

Bloch, Francis

Dutta, Bhaskar

English

This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalitionproof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions

Name not available

Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations

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Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information andCoalitional DeviationsFrancis Bloch, Bhaskar DuttaTo cite this version:Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta. Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and CoalitionalDeviations. 2006. <halshs-00410457>HAL Id: halshs-00410457https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00410457Submitted on 20 Aug 2009HAL is a multi-disciplinary open accessarchive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-entific research documents, whether they are pub-lished or not. The documents may come fromteaching and research institutions in France orabroad, or from public or private research centers.L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, estdestine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documentsscientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et derecherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoirespublics ou prive´s.        GREQAM    Groupement de Recherche en Economie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - UMR-CNRS 6579 Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales Universités d'Aix-Marseille II et III Document de Travail          n°2006-23   CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA, IN COMPLETE INFORMATION AND COALITIONAL DEVIATIONS            Francis BLOCH Bhaskar DUTTA           Mai 2006           Correlated Equilibria, IncompleteInformation and Coalitional Deviations∗Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta †May 12, 2006AbstractThis paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proofcorrelated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stageand share information about their recommendations in a credible way.When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlatedequilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition-proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable gamesand in games with positive externalities and binary actions. JELClassification Numbers: C72Keywords: correlated equilibrium, coalitions, information sharing,games with positive externalities∗Dutta gratefully acknowledges support from ESRC Grant RES-000-22-0341.†Bloch is at GREQAM, Universite d’Aix-Marseille, 2 rue de Charite, 13002 Marseille,France. He is also aﬃliated with the University of Warwick. Dutta is in the Departmentof Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, England.1

Archive Ouverte a LUniversite Lyon 2

Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and
Coalitional Deviations
Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta
To cite this version:
Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta. Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional
Deviations. 2006. <halshs-00410457>
HAL Id: halshs-00410457
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00410457
Submitted on 20 Aug 2009
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
        GREQAM 
   Groupement de Recherche en Economie 
Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - UMR-CNRS 6579 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales 
Universités d'Aix-Marseille II et III 
Document de Travail 
         n°2006-23 
 
 
CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA, IN COMPLETE 
INFORMATION AND COALITIONAL 
DEVIATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Francis BLOCH 
Bhaskar DUTTA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mai 2006 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete
Information and Coalitional Deviations∗
Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta †
May 12, 2006
Abstract
This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof
correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage
and share information about their recommendations in a credible way.
When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated
equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition-
proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games
and in games with positive externalities and binary actions. JEL
Classification Numbers: C72
Keywords: correlated equilibrium, coalitions, information sharing,
games with positive externalities
∗Dutta gratefully acknowledges support from ESRC Grant RES-000-22-0341.
†Bloch is at GREQAM, Universite d’Aix-Marseille, 2 rue de Charite, 13002 Marseille,
France. He is also aﬃliated with the University of Warwick. Dutta is in the Department
of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, England.
1


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Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations

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Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations

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